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IS VIOLENCE REALLY JUST FUN AND
GAMES?: A PROPOSAL FOR A VIOLENT
VIDEO GAME ORDINANCE THAT PASSES
CONSTITUTIONAL MUSTER
The extreme violence and sex that have saturated our culture
is hurting us in profound ways and are having an especially
harmful impact on the youngest and most impressionable in
our society. This is more than prevalent in violent video
games, and right now, nothing stops a young child from
walking into an arcade and watching or playing a game that
would shock and horrify most people.'
I. INTRODUCrION
On April 20, 1999, after habitually playing "point and shoot" violent
video games such as Doom®, a game "licensed by the United States
military to train soldiers to effectively kill," teenagers Eric Harris and
Dylan Klebold carried out one of the most heinous and infamous school
shootings in the United States, killing thirteen and injuring twenty-three
at Columbine High School in Littleton, Colorado.2 Although it would
undoubtedly be difficult to prove a direct causal connection between the
violent video games Harris and Klebold spent hours playing and the
killings they actually carried out in real life, 3 this incident illustrates that
1 Bart Peterson, Restricting Violent Video Games (May 9, 2000), available at
http://www.indygov.org/mayor/vvg (last visited Sept. 15, 2002).
2 Craig A. Anderson & Karen E. Dill, Video Games and Aggressive Thoughts, Feelings, and
Behavior in the Laboratory and in Life, 78 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 772, 772-74 (2000)
(discussing the Columbine shooting at length). In fact, once the investigation into the
Columbine shooting commenced, authorities pulled off of Harris' internet web-site a
modified version of Doom®. Id. at 772-73. In this modified version of the game, there are
two shooters, thought to be Harris and Klebold, each with extra weapons and unlimited
ammunition, gunning down victim after victim without retaliation, since the game was
developed in such a way that the people the shooters encounter are unable to fight back.
Id.; see also David C. Kiernan, Note, Shall the Sins of the Son Be Visited Upon the Father? Video
Game Manufacturer Liability for Violent Video Games, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 207, 208 (2000).
3 E.g., Sanders v. Acclaim Entm't, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d. 1264, 1276 (D. Colo. 2002)
(holding, inter alia, that the conduct of defendant video game manufacturers and movie
producers in manufacturing games and producing movies could not be considered
superseding or intervening causes in the death of William David Sanders, a teacher at
Columbine High School who was shot and killed on April 20, 1999, by Harris and Klebold);
see also Wilson v. Midway Games, Inc., 198 F. Supp. 2d 167, 171-74 (D. Conn. 2002) (holding
that Midway Games, Inc., the designer and marketer of the video game Mortal Kombat®,
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games such as these can be interpreted as having the effect of shaping
the perceptions of their minor players by portraying violence as a natural
form of expression or retaliation.4
Video games have clearly become a permanent and prevalent fixture
in the life of a staggering number of children in the United States.
Studies have indicated that an estimated seventy-nine percent of
American children play computer or video games an average of eight
hours per week.5 Although there is a system of self-regulation created
by the video game industry, 6 horrendous acts such as the one at
Columbine High School have raised concern among parents, educators,
child advocates, medical professionals, and, more importantly,
policymakers. 7 Those concerned believe that there is a need for greater
regulation in the video game industry.S
could not be held liable under the Connecticut Product Liability Act because the game did
not constitute a product for purposes of the Act); James v. Meow Media, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 2d
798, 819 (W.D. Ky. 2000), affd, 300 F.3d 683 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding, inter alia, that
defendant video game manufacturers could not be held liable under negligence and strict
liability for the death of a school-shooting victim). Meow Media involved an action brought
by the parents of a student who was killed in the December 1997 school shooting by
Michael Carneal in Paducah, Kentucky. Meow Media, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 2d at 800. The Meow
Media court based its holding regarding the game manufacturers' lack of negligence on
three main reasons: (1) the manufacturers could not have reasonably foreseen that a minor
playing its video games would murder fellow students; (2) game users' actions supersede
any violations on the part of game manufacturers; and (3) the intangible thoughts, ideas,
and messages contained within video games are not "products" for purposes of strict
product liability. Id. at 819.
4 Anderson & Dill, supra note 2, at 779-81 (finding that repeated exposure to violent
video games increased players' aggressive thought patterns, which in some cases led to
increased aggressive behavior); John Charles Kunich, Natural Born Copycat Killers and the
Law of Shock Torts, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 1157, 1165-66 (2000) (discussing how children emulate
the thoughts and images that appear in the video games); Tara C. Campbell, Comment, Did
Video Games Train The School Shooters to Kill?: Determining Wfhether Wisconsin Courts Should
Impose Negligence or Strict Liability in a Lawsuit Against the Video Game Manufacturers, 84
MARQ. L. REV. 811, 818 (2001) (noting that violent video games allow impressionable
children to participate in violence every day).
5 David Walsh, Video Game Violence and Public Policy, at http://culturalpolicy.uchicago.
edu/conf2001/papers/walsh.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2002). Although studies such as
Walsh's are based on video games in general, the focus of this Note is on the regulation of
video games located in arcades and other places of business.
6 See infra note 173 and accompanying text (discussing the American Amusement
Machine Association system of self-regulation).
7 Walsh, supra note 5.
8 Id.
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In light of these concerns, several jurisdictions proposed new laws
aimed at curbing minors' access to violent video games. 9 However, the
legality of such ordinances was not questioned until the year 2000, when
the City of Indianapolis, Indiana,10 drafted and enacted an ordinance
aimed at restricting minors' access to violent video games in arcades and
other establishments." The purpose of the Indianapolis Ordinance, as
indicated in its recitals, was to deal with the psychological and harmful
effects of violent video games on minors.12
9 See generally S. 696, 15th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1998) (prohibiting persons who operate
places of business where video games containing graphic violence are shown, displayed, or
exhibited from knowingly permitting or allowing any person under eighteen years of age
to patronize, visit, or loiter in such places of business); H.R. 2394, 81st Leg., 1st Sess. (Minn.
1999) (prohibiting any person from selling or distributing a video game containing graphic
violence to a person under eighteen years of age); Kate Clements, Carpentersville Ban on
Violent Video Gaines is Dropped-For Now, CHI. DAILY HERALD, Nov. 10, 1999, at F2, M1
(noting the decision of the city council of Carpentersville, Illinois, not to draft a proposed
ordinance banning children from playing violent video games in movie theaters,
restaurants, and bowling alleys); Jason Leopold, The Safety Zone: Moving to Curb Graphics
Violence, Stanton Is Now One of Few Cities in Nation to Prohibit Arcade Games, L.A. TIMES, Jan.
25, 1999, at B2 (discussing a proposed Stanton, California, city ordinance aimed at
restricting persons under eighteen from playing violent and sexually explicit video games
in arcades and entertainment centers). All of the preceding measures either failed to pass
through the legislative process in their respective jurisdictions or were merely proposed
but never acted upon.
10 Indianapolis, Ind., Ordinance No. 72, 2000 (July 17, 2000) ("Indianapolis Ordinance").
The main provisions at issue for the purposes of this Note are the ordinance's definitions of
the terms "graphic violence" and "harmful to minors," which state:
Graphic violence means an amusement machine's visual depiction
or representation of realistic serious injury to a human or human-like
being where such serious injury includes amputation, decapitation,
dismemberment, bloodshed, mutilation, maiming or disfiguration.
Harmful to minors means an amusement machine that
predominantly appeals to minors' morbid interest in violence or
minors' prurient interest in sex, is patently offensive to prevailing
standards in the adult community as a whole with respect to what is
suitable material for persons under the age of eighteen (18) years, lacks
serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value as a whole for
persons under the age of eighteen (18) years, and:
(1) Contains graphic violence; or,
(2) Contains strong sexual content.
Id. at section 1.
11 For an in-depth discussion of the Indianapolis Ordinance, see discussion infra Part
II.C.3.
12 Indianapolis, Ind., Ordinance No. 72, 2000. The ordinance stated in its recitals:
WHEREAS, Marion County and the City of Indianapolis have
compelling interests in protecting the well-being of minors, in
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Unfortunately, the Indianapolis Ordinance never went into effect
because of a successful First Amendment challenge by the video game
industry in American Amusement Machine Ass'n v. Kendrick.13 As a result,
no court in the United States has upheld a regulation aimed solely at
violent video games available for use in arcades and other places of
business.14  Regardless of the unfortunate and costly demise of the
protecting parents' authority to shield their minor children from
influences that the parents find inappropriate or offensive, and in
reducing juvenile crime; and
WHEREAS, our courts have recognized that minors are affected
by and may be protected from patently offensive sex-related material;
and
WHEREAS, recent academic literature corroborates the finding of
earlier studies that violent video games produce psychological effects
in minor children and that prolonged exposure to violent video games
increases the likelihood of aggression in minor children... ; and.
WHEREAS, producers and retailers of video games agree that
"the best control is parental control"; ... and... ;
WHEREAS, parents are less able in public places than in the
home to control the level of violence and sexual content to which their
minor children are exposed;...
Id. (citations omitted); see also City of Indianapolis, Office of the Mayor, Restricting Violent
Video Games, available at http://www.indygov.org/mayor/vvg (last visited Sept. 14, 2002).
Initially developed as just one of many platforms in 1999 Indianapolis mayoral candidate
Bart Peterson's "Peterson Plan," the Indianapolis Ordinance was designed to modify
Indianapolis' Municipal Code sections regarding the licensing of operators of
"amusement" locations. City of Indianapolis, Office of the Mayor, Restricting Violent Video
Games, available at http://www.indygov.org/mayor/vvg (last visited Sept. 14, 2002). Once
elected, the Indianapolis Ordinance became the first proposal of Peterson's term in early
2000. Id.
13 244 F.3d 572, 580 (7th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 994 (2001) (holding the
Indianapolis Ordinance violative of the First Amendment rights of video game
manufacturers and minors).
14 But see Interactive Digital Software Ass'n v. St. Louis County, Mo., 200 F. Supp. 2d
1126, 1141 (E.D. Mo. 2002) (upholding a St. Louis County Ordinance prohibiting making
available violent video games for establishment or home use). St. Louis County Ordinance
No. 20,193 (Oct. 26, 2000), the ordinance upheld in Interactive Digital Software Ass'n, is
aimed at minors' access to violent video games in arcades and other business
establishments as well as use of games for home use by way of purchasing or renting the
games at a retail establishment. Id. at 1129-30 (discussing the provisions of the St. Louis
County Ordinance). However, the future of the St. Louis County Ordinance still remains
uncertain and unresolved at the time this Note is being published. See, e.g., David Hudson,
Judge Upholds Video Game Restriction: St. Louis County Case Doesn't Jibe With 7th Circuit
Decision, 17 A.B.A. J. E-REPORT 5 (May 3, 2002) (discussing Interactive Digital Software Ass'n
and quoting many in the game industry who believe that the district court's decision was
incorrect for the primary reason that it did not recognize games as protected speech under
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 37, No. 1 [2002], Art. 14
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ordinance,15 the Indianapolis model can be viewed as a catalyst for other
jurisdictions in their attempts to enact similar legislation.16
This Note proposes that an ordinance aimed at restricting minors'
access to violent video games in arcades and other establishments can be
enacted and pass constitutional muster under the First Amendment if it
recognizes video games as "speech" under the First Amendment, if it is
aimed at restricting only minors' access to games, and if it has a clear
definition of what constitutes a "violent" video game harmful to
the First Amendment); Mark Jurkowitz, Appeals Court Holds Key in Battle Over Regulation of
Violent Video Games, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 2, 2002 at Dl (noting that the future of the St.
Louis County Ordinance is "on hold" and will be predicated on the outcome of a decision
by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, which will be rendered in
Spring 2003); Jeff Wagener, Letter to the Editor, Enforce Video Game Ordinance, ST. Louis
POST DISPATCH, June 22, 2002, at A36 (arguing, in his capacity as the former St. Louis
County councilman who introduced and secured passage of the county's ordinance, that
the county officials need to enforce the ordinance as soon as possible in light of the district
court's ruling as well as the continuing harm children face at the hand of violent video
games). Regardless of the legal uncertainty of the St. Louis County Ordinance, the latter
portion of the St. Louis County Ordinance (i.e., provisions regulating a minors' purchase or
rental of games in retail stores) is a feature that the Indianapolis Ordinance did not contain,
which thereby means that the ordinance proposed by this Note does not contain it either,
given that this Note corrects the two fatal flaws of the Indianapolis Ordinance (i.e., its
definitions of "violent video games" and "harmful to minors"), and the Indianapolis
Ordinance would have likely been upheld by the Seventh Circuit but for its definitions of
"violent video games" and "harmful to minors." Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n., 244 F.3d at
580 (noting, in dicta, that "a more narrowly drawn ordinance might survive a
constitutional challenge"). Thus, while the St. Louis County Ordinance, the Indianapolis
Ordinance, and the proposed ordinance of this Note all contain the common element of
attempting to regulate video games, the methods and means, as well as the reach of the
ordinances, vary significantly. See infra Part IV.B; see also VAT = Violent Arcade-Game Tax?,
at http://www.eurogamer.net/news.php?id-5697 (last visited Sept. 14, 2002). In May 2001,
the Karlsruhe Court in Germany upheld a Goettingen, Germany, city ordinance imposing a
700% higher tax rate on violent video games than for non-violent games in city arcades in
an effort to protect minors from playing such games as well as to discourage local arcade
owners from having the games in their establishments. Id.
15 Maureen Groppe, Video Game Judgment to Cost City, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Jan. 4, 2002, at
Al. In December 2001, Indianapolis, in a consent judgment, agreed to pay the video game
industry $318,000 for lawyers' fees and other costs incurred in its challenge. Id. On top of
the legal fees, Indianapolis spent an estimated $400,000 in drafting and defending the
ordinance, which raised sharp criticism in the city. See, e.g., Mike Redmond, Dear Mayor
Bart: You're Having a Cow Over the Wrong Stuff, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Nov. 1, 2001, at El.
16 Maureen Groppe, City Loses Video Game Case, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Oct. 30, 2001, at Al.
After the ordinance was struck down, Mayor Peterson stated that he had hoped passing the
ordinance raised awareness of violent video games throughout the nation and that other
local and state governments would try to enact similar laws. Id.
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minors.1 7 Part II of this Note will provide a brief history of First
Amendment jurisprudence, an in-depth examination of the Supreme
Court's jurisprudence regarding the protection of children, and the
development of case law concerning video games in general.18 Part II
will also provide an in-depth discussion of the Indianapolis Ordinance
from its inception until its demise in the courts.1 9 Part III will analyze the
key issues that a jurisdiction will need to address in the proposal and
enactment of such an ordinance. 20 Part IV will propose portions of a
model ordinance to be used by jurisdictions attempting to deal with the
effects of violent video games on minors. 21
II. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF PROTECTION OF CHILDREN
REGULATIONS CONFLICTING WITH FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS
The Framers of the Constitution intended the First Amendment's
Free Speech Clause22 to serve their deeply held ideal of individual
autonomy in the United States.23 They sought to further this ideal by
17 See infra Part IV.
18 See infra Part II.A-C.1-2.
19 See infra Part II.C.34.
20 See infra Part III. The key issues are as follows: (1) whether video games constitute
"speech" under the First Amendment; (2) what standard of review the ordinance should be
tailored under in order to be successful in potential legal challenges; and (3) what type of
definition of "violence" can pass constitutional muster. See infra Part III.
21 See infra Part IV. Since the only major challenge to such an ordinance will be its
definition of what constitutes a "violent video game harmful to minors," the proposal will
focus solely on that portion of an ordinance. For a discussion of the problems with the
"violence" definition in the Indianapolis Ordinance, see infra Part II.C.4.
22 U.S. CONST. amend. I (providing that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press ... "). The First Amendment's free speech protection
also applies to the states through its incorporation into the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. See generally Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (holding
that freedom of speech and of the press are among the fundamental personal rights and
liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from
impairment by the states).
23 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 892-902 (2d ed. 2002). In fact, the
First Amendment was regarded as the Framers' reaction to the suppression of speech and
of the press that developed in the English common law. Id. Therefore, the motivating
notion for the Framers in enacting the First Amendment was to eliminate the prior
restraints on publication, as well as the restrictions on the speech of individuals that were
punishable as crimes (e.g., speech in England was restricted by the law of seditious libel
that made criticizing the government a crime). Id. Nevertheless, following its inception
and until the nineteenth century, the First Amendment was interpreted under William
Blackstone's logic of what was regarded as free speech. Id.; see also DAVID M. O'BRIEN,
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 37, No. 1 [2002], Art. 14
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preserving the essential right of individuals to participate in free and
open discussion. 24 For the most part, the First Amendment stemmed
from the Framers' view that freedom of speech and the press was the
"great bulwark of Liberty." 25 The influential writings of English legal
and political commentators largely influenced the Framers, particularly
James Madison, thereby prompting them to press for the Constitution to
include a provision that would establish the rights that would be enjoyed
by free speech. 26 However, the Framers provided little documentation
regarding the reason why this right was essential to a democratic and
open society, leaving the purpose and effect of the Amendment to be
developed over time.27
CONSTrIUTIONAL LAW AND POLITICS: CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 355-63 (1997).
Blackstone's commentary on the notion of a right to free speech provides that
The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free state;
but this consists in laying no previous restraints upon publications, and
not in freedom from censure for criminal matter when published.
Every freeman has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments he
pleases before the public; but if he publishes what is improper,
mischievous, or illegal, he must take the consequences of his own
temerity.
Id. at 355 (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 151-
52 (1766)).
24 O'BRIEN, supra note 23, at 354-55.
25 Id. at 354-63.
26 Id.; see also, Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 545 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring). In
Thomas, Justice Jackson, in his concurrence, noted that the very purpose of the First
Amendment can be derived from the "forefathers" (i.e., Framers) lack of trust and
reluctance in conferring upon the government the right to separate the true from the false
for individuals. Id. Therefore, from the logic of the Framers, Justice Jackson stated that the
very purpose of the First Amendment was to "foreclose public authority from assuming a
guardianship of the public mind through regulating ... speech." Id. He also noted that
"[in this field every person must be his own watchman for [the] truth." Id.
27 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 23, at 892-96. Commentators have noted that this lack of
finding an explicit intent is directly attributable to there being nothing in the historical
record shedding light on free speech issues at the time of the Amendment's ratification, as
well as the myriad of free speech issues facing modem society today. Id. But see O'BRIEN,
supra note 23, at 354-56. Another group of commentators, however, have noted that a
clearer understanding of the Framers' intent can be found implicitly through a series of
drafts of the First Amendment, primarily written by Madison. Id. in these proposed drafts,
Madison's main argument was that individual autonomy and the rights to liberty in the
United States could only be achieved if individuals had the freedom to speak and express
their sentiments. Id. at 356. Because of these arguments, Madison proposed the following
draft for the First Amendment: "The people shall not be deprived or abridged of their right
to speak, to write, or to publish their sentiments; and the freedom of the press, as one of the
great bulwarks of liberty, shall be inviolable." Id.
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A. Overview of General First Amendment Standards
As a result of the Framers' ambiguity, the First Amendment has
developed into one of the most widely reaching and pervasive
constitutional provisions.28 The Framers recognized the need for the
protection of the citizenry against the suppression of free speech in order
to have a free-flowing and lively democracy.29 Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes observed that, when presented with a regulation aimed at the
suppression of speech, courts have to be "eternally vigilant" against
attempts to check the expression of "unpopular" or "immoral" opinions,
unless they serve as "immediate breaches of the peace." 30 Consequently,
Justice Holmes noted that the ultimate goal of having a robust and free-
flowing society would require an uninhibited "marketplace of ideas"
protected by the First Amendment. 31 In light of Holmes' guidance, the
Court has noted that the government must remain neutral in the
marketplace of ideas.32 Also, the First Amendment has oftentimes been
interpreted by the Court as conferring upon the citizenry a right to
receive and discern information in the free-flowing marketplace.33
Regardless of the need for a "marketplace" and free flow of ideas,
the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that the right to free
speech is not absolute.34 The Court has noted that there are certain well-
defined examples of speech that might, to varying degrees, be
28 JETHRO K. LIEBERMAN, A PRACTICAL COMPANION TO THE CONsTITUTION 204 (1999)
(noting the reach and ubiquitous nature of the First Amendment in the United States). In
light of the fact that the First Amendment covers such a vast amount of people, events, and
concerns, it would be beyond the scope of this Note to discuss each in turn.
29 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 23, at 892-96.
30 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624-31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
31 Id. at 630-631. With the "marketplace of ideas" concept, Justice Holmes' reasoning
was premised on the notion that the free trade of ideas is the ultimate goal desired and that
"the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of
the market[place of ideas], and ... truth is the only ground upon which [the citizenry's]
wishes safely can be carried out." Id.
32 Madison Sch. Dist. v. Wis. Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167, 175-76 (1976)
("To permit one side of a debatable public question to have a monopoly in expressing its
views to the government is the antithesis of constitutional guarantees.").
33 See, e.g., Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972) (noting that the Court has
referred to a First Amendment protected right to receive information and ideas in a variety
of contexts).
34 See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942). The Court noted
that "the right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all circumstances." Id.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 37, No. 1 [2002], Art. 14
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suppressed.35 In general, these types of speech include the lewd and the
obscene, 36 the profane,37 the libelous, 38 and "fighting" words.39 The
Court has noted that these forms of speech are not essential to the
exposition of ideas and are of such slight social value that any benefit
that could possibly be derived from them is outweighed by the social
interests in order and morality. 40
The Court first articulated its modern standard for assessing the
constitutionality of a regulation aimed at the suppression of speech in
Boos v. Barry.41 In Boos, the Court noted that regulations focused on the
direct impact speech has on its audience are content-based regulations.42
35 Id. at 571-72.
6 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). Miller set forth the Court's modern-day
obscenity standard. Id. at 24. Under the obscenity standard, there are three issues to assess
to determine whether a particular form of speech is obscene, and thus afforded no First
Amendment protection: (1) whether the average person, applying contemporary
community standards, would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient
interest; (2) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual
conduct specifically defined by applicable state law; and (3) whether the work, taken as a
whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. Id.
37 See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309-10 (1940) (noting that the "profane"
is typically speech that is provocative language held to amount to a breach of the peace
consisting of profane, indecent, or abusive remarks directed towards an audience). The
Court regards such words as "not in any proper sense communication of information or
opinion safeguarded by the First Amendment." Id.
3 See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 267 (1964) (stating that words
published concerning a person are libelous if they tend to injure a person in his or her
reputation in the public).
39 Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572-73. With regards to "fighting words" in particular, the
Court in Chaplinsky noted that fighting words are speech that is likely to provoke an
audience into using illegal force. Id. But see Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971)
(limiting the fighting words doctrine by holding that the use of generally provocative
words will not always justify use of a fighting words/disorderly conduct regulation); see
also Christine Egan, Fighting Words Doctrine: Are Police Officers Held to a Higher Standard, or
Per Bailey v. State, Do We Expect No More From Our Law Enforcement Officers Than We Do
From the Average Arkansan?, 52 ARK. L. REV. 591, 591-92 (1999). As commentators have
noted, in the time since the Chaplinsky doctrine was established, society has become "much
coarser," and, therefore, the fighting words doctrine set forth in 1942 by Chaplinsky is not
viewed as stringent in modem society as it was at the time of its inception. Egan, supra.
40 Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
41 485 U.S. 312, 333 (1988) (holding that the provisions of a District of Columbia
ordinance aimed at regulating the location of individuals who wished to carry signs critical
of foreign governments on the public sidewalks near the embassies of those governments
were content-based restrictions on political speech in a public forum and not narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling state interest).
42 Id. at 321-22.
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The Court further noted that content-based regulations and restrictions
on non-commercial speech are analyzed under the "strict scrutiny" test.43
Therefore, under the Boos standard, the government must show that the
regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is
narrowly drawn to achieve that end.44 The Court reaffirmed the Boos
standard four years later in Burson v. Freeman.45 In Burson, the Court
noted that, as a general matter, content-based restrictions on speech are
"hostile" to the First Amendment and that it is the government's burden
to prove why the regulation is necessary and proper.46
Aside from this standard the government must adhere to in drafting
and enacting regulations, the Court has often noted the "familiar
principle of constitutional law" that the Court is not a "super-
legislature," and, therefore, it will not strike down an otherwise
constitutional statute on the basis of an alleged illicit legislative motive.47
Rather, the Court grants deference to the legislative branch and does not
judge the motivating notions of the legislative branch unless they are
clearly arbitrary. 48
Typically, the question of whether speech is protected by the First
Amendment depends on the content and type of speech.49 For example,
in Young v. American Mini Theatres,50 four Justices of the Court asserted
that, although it is the Court's duty to defend the right to speak, there is
a hierarchy of speech and certain forms of speech are not worth
43 Id.
4 Id.
45 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992) (holding a Tennessee statute prohibiting solicitation of votes
and display or distribution of campaign materials within 100 feet of the entrance to a
polling place constitutional under the First Amendment and the Boos standard because it
was narrowly tailored to serve the compelling state interest of preventing voter
intimidation and election fraud).
46 Id. at 197-98. The Court in Burson further noted that this "hostility" of the First
Amendment extends, not only to a restriction on a particular viewpoint, but also to a
prohibition of public discussion of an entire topic. Id. at 197.
47 E.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383-84 (1968). In O'Brien, the Court upheld
a congressional statute prohibiting the burning of a selective service registration certificate
(i.e., a "draft card"). Id. at 386.
48 Id. at 383-84.
49 Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 72-73 (1976) (upholding city ordinances
prohibiting operation of any "adult" movie theater, bookstore, and similar establishments
within 1000 feet of any other "adult" establishment or within 500 feet of a residential area).
50 Id.
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"march[ing] our sons and daughters off to war to preserve." 51 In light of
this hierarchy, certain types of speech are recognized as being highly
valued, others are of a slightly lower value, while still other forms are of
little or no value and fall within the "outer ambit of First Amendment
Protection."5 2
In assessing the suppression of speech, the Court has also crafted a
distinction between content-based and content-neutral regulations.53 On
the one hand, the Court has noted that regulations enacted for the
purpose of restraining speech based on its content presumptively violate
the First Amendment.54 In order for the government to support its
content-based regulation of speech, it must satisfy strict scrutiny review
by asserting a compelling interest with means narrowly tailored to
accomplish that interest.55 Unless the means chosen are the only
effective means by which the government's interest can be effectively
achieved, the government will be forced to choose a plausible, less
restrictive alternative.5 6 On the other hand, the Court has noted that
content-neutral regulations, which typically involve a restriction on the
time, place, and manner of the speech, are acceptable so long as they are
designed to serve a substantial governmental interest and do not
51 Id. at 70-71. The Court noted that although it will not tolerate total suppression of a
type of speech, there exists this "hierarchy" of sorts in which protecting a certain type of
expression (e.g., sexually explicit material) is of a wholly different and lesser magnitude
than forms of speech viewed as "fundamental" and "necessary" to a free-flowing
democracy. Id. at 64-70. Accordingly, the Court held that the government may legitimately
use the content of certain materials as a basis for placing them in a different classification
from other forms of speech. Id. at 70-71.
52 Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 567 (1991) (upholding a state statute
prohibiting the knowing or intentional appearing in a public place in a state of nudity); see
also City of Erie v. PAP'S A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 296-302 (2000) (upholding a city ordinance
relying on the Barnes decision).
53 See generally Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986) (upholding a zoning
ordinance that prohibited adult motion picture theaters from locating within 1000 feet of
any residential zone, single or multiple-family dwelling, church, park, or school).
5 Id. at 46-47.
55 Id. Strict scrutiny requires the following in order for a content-based regulation to be
upheld: (1) a compelling state interest; (2) a narrowly tailored fit between the means and
end; and (3) no available less restrictive alternatives. Id. However, the Court has noted
that a regulation can still meet strict scrutiny without being the least-restrictive or least-
intrusive means of regulation "so long as the regulation promotes a substantial
governmental interest that would be achieved less effectively, absent the regulation."
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 782-83 (1989).
56 United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 815-16 (2000); Boos v.
Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1988).
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unreasonably limit alternative avenues of communication.5 7  Such
regulations are generally subject to intermediate scrutiny.58 Lastly,
regulations on speech that are aimed at serving a legitimate government
purpose and do not directly deal with the content or effect of the speech
are subject to a rational basis standard of review, requiring that the
government establish only a legitimate purpose.5 9
Despite these general distinctions, there is not a bright-line rule for
courts to follow when reviewing a regulation suppressing speech.60
Many types of regulations do not fit neatly into one of these three broad
categories. 61 Therefore, the First Amendment analysis of regulations
aimed at either speech itself, the primary effects of speech, or the
"secondary effects" of speech,62 is an extremely fact-specific inquiry that
57 Renton, 475 U.S. at 47; Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293
(1984).
58 Renton, 475 U.S. at 47. Under intermediate scrutiny, a law will be upheld if it is
substantially related to an important government purpose. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v.
FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 662 (1994).
59 Red Lion Broad. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390-92 (1969). Under rational basis, a law will
be upheld if it is rationally related to the legitimate government purpose. Id. In fact, the
purpose need not be the actual goal of the litigation, rather any conceivable legitimate
purpose is sufficient so long as the means chosen are a reasonable way to accomplish the
objective. Id.
60 See generally Geoffrey R. Stone, Restrictions of Speech Because of its Content: The Peculiar
Case of Subject Matter Restrictions, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 81, 81-84 (1978).
61 Renton, 475 U.S. at 47-49. The Court dealt squarely with this issue in Renton. Id. The
Court noted that the ordinance at issue did not fit neatly into the "'content-based' or
'content-neutral' category." Id. at 47. Rather, the Court noted that, while the ordinance on
its face appeared to be aimed at regulating the content of the speech, it was nevertheless
more akin to a content-neutral -regulation, since the "predominate concern" of the
government in suppressing the speech was to deal chiefly with the "secondary effects" the
speech at issue in the ordinance would cause if it was absolutely "free." Id. at 47-48.
62 Id. In general, secondary effects involve the government's predominate concern being
not with the content of the speech regulated but rather with the effect that the speech will
have on its surrounding area, as well as through individuals "hearing" the speech. Id. at
47-48. Particularly in Renton, the Court noted that the ordinance was "designed to prevent
crime, protect the city's retail trade, maintain property values, and generally protect and
preserve the 'quality' of the city's neighborhoods, commercial districts, and the quality of
urban life." Id. at 48. The "secondary effects" logic also illustrates that the government is
not predominately concerned with suppressing speech because if they were, the regulation
would try to close the establishment engaged in the speech or restrict their number rather
than "circumscribe their choice as to location." Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S.
50, 82 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring). The Court has held that the "secondary effects"
approach does not apply to content-based regulations. See, e.g., United States v. Playboy
Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 815 (2000) (holding that the "lesser scrutiny afforded
regulations targeting the secondary effects of crime or declining property values has no
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often results in different outcomes for ordinances that appear similar in
their aim but deal with different areas of protected speech.63
Furthermore, a regulation aimed at suppressing speech must be
explicitly clear in its reach and parameters in order to avoid being struck
down for vagueness 64 or overbreadth. 65 There are three factors for courts
to consider when deciding whether a law is unconstitutionally vague
under the First Amendment: (1) whether the law is of sufficient clarity to
"give a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know
what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly;" (2) whether the law
provides "explicit standards for those who apply them;" and (3) whether
the law "abuts upon sensitive areas of basic First Amendment
freedoms."66 With regard to overbreadth, the Court has held that, in
order for a statute to be declared unconstitutional, there must be
"substantial overbreadth."67 Substantial overbreadth occurs when a law
is: (1) excessive in regulation and (2) substantially excessive in relation
to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep.68
B. Overview of the Supreme Court's Jurisprudence Regarding First
Amendment Regulations Aimed at the Protection of Children
Under First Amendment jurisprudence, the Court has repeatedly
noted that the government, depending on the type of speech, has either a
compelling interest or an exceedingly persuasive justification in
protecting children from obscene, harmful, and other types of speech.69
application to content-based regulations targeting the primary effects of protected
speech").
63 See generally Larry Alexander, Low Value Speech, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 547 (1989); Geoffrey
R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189 (1983);
Cass R. Sunstein, Low Value Speech Revisited, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 555 (1989).
64 See generally Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 107-108 (1972) (holding that
"an enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined").
6 See, e.g., Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612-15 (1973) (holding that an
overbroad statute, by its very existence, may prevent parties from uttering constitutionally
protected speech or expression).
66 Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108-09.
67 Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 612-15 (emphasis added).
68 Id. at 615.
69 See generally Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 122 S. Ct. 1389, 1403 (2002)
(recognizing the government's ability to place restrictions on speech in order to protect
children, but noting that the "speech ban" must be narrowly drawn); Lorillard Tobacco Co.
v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 570-71 (2001) (recognizing the government's compelling interest in
protecting children but noting that it is not absolute); Denver Area Educ. Telecomm.
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Moreover, several jurisdictions have enacted "harmful to minor" laws.70
In these laws, the government's primary goal is to protect minors from
certain forms of low-value speech that the government has found
detrimental to the mental growth and development of minors.7'
Courts have long recognized that parents have a strong and vital
role in the upbringing of their children. In order to supplement this role,
the government has a legitimate and sometimes compelling interest in
the upbringing of "its" children.72 The most common method of
promoting these strong interests is the enactment of laws aimed at
shielding children from materials and speech that are deemed offensive
on their face, have a peculiar element that could warp children's minds,
or have a substantial effect on their upbringing in the formative years of
their lives.73
Bearing in mind this legitimate and sometimes compelling interest of
the government in protecting children, the Court has recognized "three
Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 743 (1996) (recognizing the need to protect children
from exposure to patently offensive sex-related material); Sable Communications of Cal.,
Inc., v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (recognizing that there is a "compelling interest in
protecting the physical and psychological well-being of minors"); New York v. Ferber, 458
U.S. 747, 756-57 (1982) (noting that the government is entitled to greater leeway in the
regulation of pornographic depictions of children); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726,
735-37 (1978) (noting that the unique accessibility and pervasiveness of materials can entitle
governmental regulation of material in order to protect children); Ginsberg v. New York,
390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968) (noting that the well-being of "its" children is a subject within the
government's constitutional power to regulate).
70 See, e.g., Jim McCormick, Protecting Children From Music Lyrics: Sound Recordings and
"Harmful to Minors" Statutes, 23 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 679, 693-98 (1993) (arguing that
"harmful to minor" laws have the potential to, if drafted correctly, reach a countless and
wide range of speech); see also supra note 10 (providing a typical definition of "harmful to
minors" in the Indianapolis ordinance); infra notes 90-155 (discussing at length a series of
"harmful to minor" laws and the judicial decisions regarding them).
71 McCormick, supra note 70, at 679-81.
7 See infra notes 74-81 and accompanying text.
7 Catherine J. Ross, Anything Goes: Examining The State's Interest in Protecting Children
from Controversial Speech, 53 VAND. L. REV. 427, 436-46 (2000) (noting that the political and
social environment in which parents must today raise their children is an environment in
which "anything goes" given that profanity, vulgarity, sex, and violence are pervasive in
television programming, movies, and other forms of entertainment that appeal to the
interests of children as well as the populace at large). As a result of this "anything goes"
attitude, Ross notes that this popular concern about children's exposure to harmful
material has resulted in the spear-heading of a great deal of legislative enactments and
measures geared toward protecting children from "harmful" forms of entertainment, with
varying degrees of success. Id.
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reasons justifying the conclusion that the constitutional rights of children
cannot be equated with those of adults: (1) the peculiar vulnerability of
children; (2) children's inability to make critical decisions in an informed,
mature manner; and (3) the importance of the parental role in child
rearing."74
First, the Court's concern for the vulnerability of children is typically
demonstrated in its decisions dealing with minors' claims to
constitutional protections of liberty or property interests by the state.75
Although the courts have recognized some parity between adults and
minors in an area where minors may be vulnerable, the courts have also
noted that the government is entitled to adjust its legal system to account
for children's vulnerability as well as children's needs for "concern, ...
sympathy, and.., parental attention."76
Second, the Court has held that the government may limit the
freedom of minors to choose for themselves when such a choice may
have potentially serious consequences.7 The jurisprudence in the
"choices of children" realm has typically been premised on the notion
that, "during the formative years of childhood and adolescence, minors
often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and
avoid choices that could be detrimental to them," which thereby allows
the government to treat them on a different plateau from adults.78
Third, the compelling and guiding role of parents and guardians in
the upbringing of their children justifies limitations on the freedom of
minors, given that the government "commonly protects its youth from
74 Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979) (holding that a statute requiring a minor
seeking an abortion to obtain the consent of her parents, or to obtain judicial approval
following notification to her parents, unconstitutionally burdened the right of the pregnant
minor to seek an abortion).
75 See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment's
guarantee against the deprivation of liberty without due process of law is applicable to
children in juvenile delinquency proceedings).
76 McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 550 (1971); see also In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 30
(noting that in order to preserve the "separate avenues" of dealing with juvenile
adjudication, hearings in juvenile delinquency cases need not necessarily "conform with all
of the requirements of an [adult] criminal trial or even of the usually administrative
hearing"). Id.
77 See, e.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 649-50 (1968) (Stewart, J., concurring)
("[A] child-like someone in a captive audience-is not possessed of that full capacity for
individual choice which is the presupposition of First Amendment guarantees.").
78 Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 635 (quoting Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 649).
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adverse governmental action and from their own immaturity by
requiring parental consent to or involvement in important decisions by
minors."79 Additionally, and perhaps more importantly, the government
gives deference to parents and guardians because, as the Court has
noted, "[t]he child is not the mere creature of the state; those who
nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high
duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations."8 0
Therefore, the Court has come to the conclusion that the tradition of
parental authority is that legal restrictions on minors, especially those
supportive of the parental role, may be important to a child's chances for
full growth and maturity that make eventual participation in a free
society meaningful and rewarding.81
Regardless of the state's compelling interest in protecting and
treating children differently in these three broad and distinct contexts,
the Court has also noted that children are nevertheless entitled to similar
rights as adults under the Constitution.82 With a certain degree of parity,
the Court has noted that a regulation with the goal of protecting children
will not be upheld when it restricts minor and adult access equally and
thereby reduces adults' speech to only what is fit for children.83 With
this framework in mind, an in-depth examination of the crucial cases in
79 Id. at 637.
80 Pierce v. Soc'y of Sister of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925)
(holding that parents' duty to prepare their children for "additional obligations" must be
given due deference and can be expanded to include such things as the inculcation of
moral standards, religious beliefs, and elements of good citizenship). Further, the Court
noted that the primary function of parents is to prepare their children for obligations that
the state can neither supply nor hinder. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
81 See, e.g., Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 639 (noting that under the Constitution, the state can
properly conclude that parents and others who have the primary responsibility for
children's well-being are entitled to the support of laws designed to aid discharge of that
responsibility).
82 See generally Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976)
("Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only when one attains
the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as well as adults are protected by the
Constitution and possess constitutional rights."); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967) (noting
that a child, merely on account of his minority, is not beyond the protection of the
Constitution).
83 Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957) (striking down a statute making it an offense
to make available to the general reading public a book having "potentially deleterious
influence" on youth). The Court further reasoned that the legislation aimed at protecting
minors was not reasonably restricted to that particular "evil," and it thereby violated First
Amendment rights by reducing the adult population to reading only that which was fit for
children. Id. at 383.
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the Court's modem-day jurisprudence concerning the protection of
minors from harmful materials must be conducted.
In Prince v. Massachusetts,8 the Court noted for the first time that a
state has a compelling interest in the protection of children from
"harmful" speech.85 The Court reasoned that various types of speech
create difficult circumstances for adults and are "wholly inappropriate"
for children of "tender years."86 Further, the Court established that the
government has the authority to "control the conduct of children" and
that such authority can at times, "reach beyond the scope of its authority
over adults" without raising Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection
Clause concerns or other similar differentiating class problems that
typically arise when groups of people are treated unequally.87
8 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
85 Id. at 170. In Prince, the Court upheld the conviction of Sarah Prince, a Jehovah's
Witness and mother of two children, under a Massachusetts protection of children law. Id.
at 171. Prince had taken her two children with her to distribute religious and political
pamphlets at a late hour of the night to pedestrians on a street in downtown Brockton,
Massachusetts. Id. at 161-62.
8 Id. at 170; see also Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 116 (2001) (citing
Sch. Dist. of City of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 390 (1985), overruled by, Agostini v.
Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997)) (noting that children of "tender years" are children whose
experience in the real-world is limited and their beliefs are the function of "environment as
much as of free and voluntary choice").
87 Id. Aside from First Amendment-type settings, another common area in which the
courts have dealt with treating children differently in "harmful to minors" areas has most
notably occurred in the Court's jurisprudence involving state abortion laws that prohibit
minors' access to abortions without certain formalities being met by the minor seeking the
abortion. See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 433 U.S. 622 (1979); Danforth, 428 U.S. at 52. In Danforth,
the Court struck down a section of a Missouri law that required parental consent for
minors seeking an abortion. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74-75. Regardless of the outcome, the
Court re-affirmed the basic premise of Prince that the "State has somewhat broader
authority to regulate the activities of children than of adults." Id. It just so happens that in
Danforth there was not a "significant state interest in conditioning an abortion on the
consent of a parent or person in loco parentis that was not present in the case of an adult."
Id. at 75. Along the same lines, the Court, three years later in Bellotti, re-affirmed the
position of Prince and its progeny that minors can be treated differently than adults. Belloti,
443 U.S. at 633-39. The Court held that a Massachusetts statute requiring a minor seeking
an abortion to obtain the consent of her parents, or to obtain judicial approval following
notification to her parents, unconstitutionally burdened the right of the pregnant minor to
seek an abortion. Id. As discussed above, the Bellotti Court examined the three areas in
which the constitutional rights of minors cannot be equated with that of adults and found
that neither a minor's vulnerability, inability to make critical decisions, nor the importance
of the parental role in child rearing were sufficient to place the undue burden on minors'
A.: Is Violence Really Just Fun and Games?:  A Proposal for a Violent
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2002
446 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol.37
The 1968 case of Ginsberg v. New York8s is the only case where the
Court has dealt squarely with the issue of a state regulation aimed at
suppressing only children's access to harmful or indecent speech, while
leaving adult access unfettered.89  At issue in Ginsberg was Sam
Ginsberg's conviction under a New York state law regulating exposure
of minors to harmful materials ("section 484-h"), which prohibited the
sale of obscene magazines to minors under seventeen years of age.90
access to abortion under the scheme of Massachusetts' abortion statute. Id. at 639-50; see
also supra notes 74-81 and accompanying text.
88 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
89 See, e.g., Petitioners' Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 15-16, Kendrick v. Am.
Amusement Mach. Ass'n, 534 U.S. 994 (2001) [hereinafter Certiorari Petition] (Petition on
file with Law Review) (arguing that deep confusion exists because the Court has not
discussed the issue of restricting youth access while leaving adult access unfettered since
Ginsberg).
90 Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 629-33. New York Penal Law section 484-h as enacted by L. 1965,
c. 327 is as follows:
1. Definitions. As used in this section:
(a) "Minor" means any person under the age of seventeen
years.
(b) "Nudity" means the showing of the human male or
female genitals, pubic area or buttocks with less than a full
opaque covering, or the showing of the female breast with less
than a fully opaque covering of any portion thereof below the top
of the nipple, or the depiction of covered male genitals in a
discernibly turgid state.
(c) "Sexual conduct" means acts of masturbation,
homosexuality, sexual intercourse, or physical contact with a
person's clothed or unclothed genitals, pubic area, buttocks or, if
such person be a female, breast.
(d) "Sexual excitement" means the condition of human male
or female genitals when in a state of sexual stimulation or arousal.
(e) "Sado-masochistic abuse" means flagellation or torture
by or upon a person clad in undergarments, a mask or bizarre
costume, or the condition of being fettered, bound or otherwise
physically restrained on the part of one so clothed.
(Q) "Harmful to minors" means that quality of any description or
representation, in whatever form, of nudity, sexual conduct, sexual
excitement, or sadomasochistic abuse, when it:
(i) predominantly appeals to the prurient, shameful or
morbid interest of minors, and
(ii) is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult
community as a whole with respect to what is suitable material for
minors, and
(iii) is utterly without redeeming social importance for
minors.
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Ginsberg's charges and conviction were the result of a mother's
complaint to local authorities that Ginsberg had sold inappropriate
"girlie" magazines to her sixteen-year-old son on two separate occasions
at Ginsberg's convenience store.91  The Court held that it was
(g) "Knowingly" means having general knowledge of, or
reason to know, or a belief or ground for belief which warrants
further inspection or inquiry of both:
(i) the character and content of any material described
herein which is reasonably susceptible of examination by the
defendant, and
(ii) the age of the minor, provided however, that an
honest mistake shall constitute an excuse from liability hereunder
if the defendant made a reasonable bona fide attempt to ascertain
the true age of such minor.
2. It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to sell or loan
for monetary consideration to a minor:
(a) any picture, photograph, drawing, sculpture, motion
picture film, or similar visual representation or image of a person
or portion of the human body which depicts nudity, sexual
conduct or sado-masochistic abuse and which is harmful to
minors, or
(b) any book, pamphlet, magazine, printed matter however
reproduced, or sound recording which contains any matter
enumerated in paragraph (a) of subdivision two hereof, or
explicit and detailed verbal descriptions or narrative accounts of
sexual excitement, sexual conduct or sado-masochistic abuse and
which, taken as a whole, is harmful to minors.
3. It -shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to exhibit for a
monetary consideration to a minor or knowingly to sell to a
minor an admission ticket or pass or knowingly to admit a minor
for a monetary consideration to premises whereon there is
exhibited, a motion picture, show or other presentation which, in
whole or in part, depicts nudity, sexual conduct or sado-
masochistic abuse and which is harmful to minors.
4. A violation of any provision hereof shall constitute a
misdemeanor.
Id. at 646-47 (Appendix A to Opinion of the Court) (emphasis added).
91 Id. at 631. After the boy's mother had brought forth this information to the authorities
and also confronted and scolded Ginsberg for selling the magazines to her son, the youth
and the local police sergeant set up a "sting" operation in which the youth would purchase
three magazines from Ginsberg's store that fell under the definitions of section 484-h as
"harmful to minors" and, if sold to the minor, would result in the sergeant charging
Ginsberg with a misdemeanor for his section 484-h violation. Id. With this scenario in
place, the youth entered Ginsberg's store, brought three "girlie" magazines to the cash
register and informed Ginsberg that he was only sixteen years of age. Id.; see also Samuel
Krislov, From Ginzburg to Ginsberg: The Unhurried Children's Hour in Obscenity Litigation,
1968 Sup. CT. REV. 153, 169-70 (1968) (discussing the factual scenario under which Ginsberg
arose). Even though he was provided with this information, Ginsberg still proceeded to
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constitutionally permissible for New York "to accord minors under
seventeen a more restricted right to judge and determine for themselves
what sex material they may read or see than that assured to adults." 92
The Ginsberg Court's analysis and reasoning was premised on the
Court's reasoning in Prince.93 However, unlike Prince, the Court in
Ginsberg dealt squarely with an area of speech that created different
standards of what was "obscene" or "harmful" for adults and children.
The Court noted that, although the magazines under the purview of
section 484-h were "obscene" only by a child's standard, this did not
necessarily mean that adult access to these materials would be hindered
by the statute.94 Rather, the Court asserted that section 484-h did not bar
Ginsberg from stocking the magazines and selling them to persons
seventeen years of age or older, which meant that adult access to these
magazines would remain unfettered.95
With the issue of adult access decided, the Court's reasoning then
shifted to an analysis of whether children and adults could be held to
different standards when the legislature determined the material at issue
was harmful to minors.96 The Court reasoned that a dichotomy allowing
adult access to materials, while prohibiting access to minors, did not
violate a minor's First Amendment rights.97 The Court reasoned that
material that is protected for distribution to adults is not necessarily
constitutionally protected from restriction upon its dissemination to
children.98 The Court further noted that the government "can exercise its
power to protect the health, safety, welfare and morals of its community
sell the three magazines to the minor, and the sergeant then charged Ginsberg with the
section 484-h violation. Krislov, supra, at 169. The main premise of Ginsberg's argument in
his case before the Supreme Court relied on the fact that section 484-h was beyond the
scope of the state's legislative power to adopt a Roth-type obscenity formulation to define
the material's obscenity on the basis of its appeal to minors. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 635. With
the gravaman of Ginsberg's claim in place, the Court affirmed Ginsberg's conviction,
finding that section 484-h was within the purview of a state's power to regulate, given a
state's compelling interest in protecting children from activities and materials that can be
particularly harmful to minors but not necessarily to adults. Id.
92 Id. at 637.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 634-35.
95 Id.
% Id. at 636-39.
97 Id. at 636.
98 Id. The Court further noted that the concept of obscenity or of unprotected matter
may vary according to the group to whom it is "quarantined." Id.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 37, No. 1 [2002], Art. 14
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol37/iss1/14
2002] FUN AND GAMES 449
by barring the distribution" of materials to children that are recognized
as suitable for adults.99 This is primarily because of the states' "exigent
interest" in preventing distribution and availability of objectionable or
harmful material to children.10 0 Ginsberg argued that section 484-h
deprived minors of their constitutionally protected freedoms to read the
protected materials under an adult obscenity standard.'01 The Court
rejected this argument by noting that the State had simply adjusted the
definition of obscenity "to social realties by permitting the appeal of this
type of material to be assessed in term[s] of the sexual interests ... of
such minors." 10 2 The remainder of the Court's discussion, as well as the
major premise of its logic, was that a state statute aimed at protecting
children is oftentimes a constitutional exercise of a state's power and that
the well-being of children residing in the state is a subject within the
state's constitutional power to regulate 0 3
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 638.
102 Id. (quoting Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 509 (1962)). The Court further noted
that, even where there is an alleged invasion of minors' "protected freedoms, the power of
the state to control the conduct of children can reach beyond the scope of its authority over
adults." Id.; see also Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72
YALE L.J. 877, 938-39 (1963). The Ginsberg Court relied on Emerson's article for the
following argument:
'Different factors come into play, also, where the interest at stake is the
effect of erotic expression upon children. The world of children is not
strictly part of the adult realm of free expression. The factor of
immaturity, and perhaps other considerations, impose different rules.
Without attempting here to formulate the principles relevant to
freedom of expression for children, it suffices to say that regulations of
communication addressed to them need not conform to the
requirements of the first amendment in the same way as those
applicable to adults.'
Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 639 (citing Emerson, supra).
103 Id. at 639-40 (noting that with society's "transcendent interest" in protecting the
welfare of children, it is "fitting and proper for a State to include in a statute designed to
regulate the sale of pornography to children special standards broader than those
embodied in legislation aimed at controlling dissemination of such material to adults").
The Court also expanded on this point by noting that a statute aimed at restricting only
children's access to materials or activities, while leaving adult access unfettered, for
morality or protectionist reasons, is "better" than a blanket-type prohibition of the
materials or activities for all members in the community. Id.; see also Louis Henkin, Morals
and the Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 391, 413 n.68 (1963) (noting
that, by leaving adult access unfettered and allowing parents to make the decision as to
whether they will allow such harmful materials or activities in their household, "one can
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The last point addressed by the Court was whether a state could
assert a legislative finding that the material condemned by the statute
was a "basic factor in impairing the ethical and moral development of
our youth and a clear and present danger to the people of the state"
without an accepted scientific fact.104 To this point, the Court noted that
obscene or near-obscene speech "may be suppressed without a showing
of the circumstances which lie behind the clear and present danger in its
application to protected speech." 05 The Court concluded by noting that,
in assessing a state's legislation, it does not demand of the legislatures
"scientifically certain criteria of legislation."10 6 Rather, a rational relation
to the objective of safeguarding minors from harm will often be
sufficient, and the state can even rely on studies that merely purport, but
do not explicitly demonstrate, a causal connection between the activity
and the harm caused.10 7
The subsequent cases regarding legislation protecting children have
not always resulted in the favorable outcome in Ginsberg.08 Although
the Court recognizes the state's compelling interest in protecting
children, it frequently may not be enough for the state to rely on this
when enacting such legislation.1° 9 The Court's next major case dealing
with the protection of children was Erznoznik v. Jacksonville."° The
legislation at issue in Erznoznik was a Jacksonville, Florida, city
ordinance prohibiting the display of films containing nudity by a drive-
in theater when its screen was visible from a public street."' The case
well distinguish laws which do not impose a morality on children, but which support the
right of parents to deal with the morals of their children as they see fit").
104 Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 641-43.
105 Id. at 641 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 486-87 (1957)). The Court
further noted that in order to "sustain the State power to exclude material defined as
obscenity by section 484-h, the Court must be able to say that it was not irrational for the
legislature to find that exposure to material condemned by the statute was harmful to
minors." Id.
106 Id. at 643.
107 Id. On this last point, the Court noted that a legislature can rely on "imperfect"
studies that do not show a direct causal link between the activity and the harm because,
while the studies do not demonstrate a causal link, a causal link is not disproved either. Id.
108 See infra notes 109-57 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's jurisprudence
following Ginsberg).
109 See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813-14 (2000)
(noting that the objective of shielding children does not suffice to support a blanket ban if
the protection can be accomplished by a less restrictive alternative).
110 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
11 Id. at 206. Section 330.313 of the Jacksonville Municipal Code was as follows:
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arose after the manager of a drive-in theater was charged for violating
the ordinance by exhibiting a motion picture that contained nudity and
was visible from the public streets.112
The Court held that the ordinance did not satisfy the rigorous
constitutional standards that apply when the government attempts to
regulate expression. u 3 The Court premised its reasoning on four main
points, two of which related to the protection of children.11 4 First, the
Court noted that the ordinance discriminated among movies solely on
the basis of content (i.e., distinguishing non-nudity from nudity) and had
the effect of deterring drive-in theaters from showing movies containing
any nudity, however innocent or educational." 5 On this first point, the
Court further noted that censorship of otherwise constitutionally
permissible speech could not be justified on the basis of the limited
privacy interest of persons, in particular children, who, if offended,
could easily look the other way since they were not a captive audience
Drive-In Theaters, Films Visible From Public Streets or Public Places.
It shall be unlawful and it is hereby declared a public nuisance for any
ticket seller, ticket taker, usher, motion picture projection machine
operator, manager, owner, or any other person connected with or
employed by any drive-in theater in the City to exhibit, or aid or assist
in exhibiting, any motion picture, slide, or other exhibit in which the
human male or female bare buttocks, human female bare breasts, or
human bare public [sic] areas are shown, if such motion picture, slide,
or other exhibit is visible from any public street or public place.
Violation of this section shall be punishable as a Class C offense.
Id. at 206-07.
112 Id. at 206. The movie Erznoznik showed at the theater had received an "R" rating by
the Motion Picture Association of America ("MPAA"). Id. For a more in-depth discussion
of media self-regulation, including the MPAA, see infra notes 163-66 and accompanying
text. When Erznoznik brought a separate action challenging the validity of the ordinance,
the city asserted two primary justifications for enacting the ordinance: (1) suppressing the
public nuisances caused by drive-ins showing films with nudity that are visible from public
streets and (2) protecting children from indecent or obscene films. Id. at 207. The trial
court and state court of appeals upheld the ordinance as a legitimate exercise of the
municipality's police power and ruled that it did not infringe upon Erznoznik's First
Amendment rights. Id. Erznoznik appealed the ruling, arguing that the ordinance swept
too broadly and was "shutting off" a form of discourse solely to protect others from
hearing it, even though they were not a captive audience but were parties on the street with
diminished expectations of privacy. Id.
113 Id. at 217 (noting that where First Amendment freedoms are at stake, the Court has
repeatedly emphasized that precision of drafting and clarity of purpose are essential).
114 Id. at 214-17. The Court's other two main premises of reasoning involved nuisance
and disruption of traffic issues. Id.
115 Id. at 208-12.
A.: Is Violence Really Just Fun and Games?:  A Proposal for a Violent
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2002
452 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol.37
and did not have the high expectation of privacy that they would in the
sanctity of their own home.116 As to the second point, the Court
reasoned that the ordinance could not be justified as an exercise of the
city's police power for the purpose of protecting children from viewing
these films. 117  Regardless, the Court still took this opportunity to
reaffirm the central holding of Ginsberg by noting that, if the ordinance
were more narrowly tailored, it would pass constitutional muster
because the government may adopt more stringent controls on
communicative materials available to youths than on those available to
adults. 18
Following Erznoznik, the Court dealt with the issue of protecting
children from harmful material in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation.119 In
Pacifica, the Court upheld the Federal Communications Commission's'
("FCC") right to restrict and regulate "patently offensive," though not
necessarily obscene, speech. 20 Pacifica arose after a New York radio
station, owned by the Pacifica Foundation, broadcasted, on a weekday
afternoon, a pre-recorded monologue by comedian George Carlin
entitled "Filthy Words" in which Carlin referred to and uttered a series
of "dirty words".' 21
116 Id. at 210-12; see also Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21-22 (1971) (noting that "'we are
often 'captives' outside the sanctuary of the home and subject to objectionable speech"' and
that "[tihe ability of the government, consonant with the Constitution, to shut off discourse
solely to protect others from hearing it is ... dependent upon a showing that substantial
privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner").
117 Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 212-14 (noting that the ordinance, in light of its goal of
protecting children, was broader than permissible, given that it sweepingly forbid any
nudity and not just "obscene" or "indecent" nudity, which the Court seems to suggest
would have allowed the ordinance to be upheld in light of Ginsberg had this error been
corrected).
118 Id. at 212.
119 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
120 Id. at 751.
121 Id. at 729-30. A few weeks after the Carlin broadcast, the Federal Communications
Commission ("FCC") received a letter from a man who complained of the station's
broadcast of the Carlin monologue, stating that, when the station aired the piece, he was
driving in his car with his young son. Id. The FCC then forwarded the complaint to the
station for comment, and Pacifica defended the playing of the Carlin monologue by noting
that the show playing it was about "contemporary society's attitude toward language" and
that prior to the broadcast, the station had issued a warning that the program included
"sensitive language which might be regarded as offensive to some." Id. The FCC then
issued a declaratory order granting the complaint and holding that Pacifica could have
been the subject of administrative sanctions. However, the FCC merely put the incident on
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Agreeing with the FCC's logic regarding the protection of children
and "nuisance channeling," the Court affirmed the FCC's power to
regulate the airwaves from such "indecent" material.122 Aside from a
focus on the time of the broadcast, the content of the program, and the
ineffectiveness of a warning prior to the broadcast, the main portions of
the Court's reasoning relating to the protection of children pointed to the
pervasiveness of broadcasting in our society and its unique accessibility
to children.123 The Court noted that even those too young to read would
have access and that society has a special interest in protecting children
from such speech during the impressionable years of development. 124
The Court once again reaffirmed the central holding of Ginsberg and
noted that the government's interest in the "well-being of its youth" and
the station's record and noted that, should the station engage in such activity again, formal
sanctions could be a possibility. Id. By issuing this order, the FCC was reaffirming the
power that Congress granted to it to: (1) revoke a station's license; (2) issue a cease and
desist order; (3) impose a monetary forfeiture for a station's violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1464;
(4) deny license renewal; or (5) grant a short term renewal. Id. at 730 n.1. Section 1464 of
the United States Code referred to by the FCC provides that: "[wihoever utters any
obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of radio communication shall be fined not
more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both." Id. at 731 (quoting 18
U.S.C. § 1464 (1976)). The FCC also used this opportunity to note that, under the powers
conferred upon it by Congress, the FCC could regulate "patently offensive" and other
"harmful to minor"-type speech in a manner comparable to nuisance law, where the FCC
could require licensed stations to "channel" the broadcast of such materials to times during
which exposure to children would be unlikely. Id. The FCC suggested in its ruling that, if
an offensive broadcast had literary, artistic, political, or scientific value and was preceded
by warnings, it might not be indecent in the late evening, but would be so during the day
when children are more likely to be in the audience. Id. at 732 n.5. Pacifica appealed the
FCC's order, and the court of appeals reversed the FCC's declaratory order on overbreadth
and First Amendment grounds as a form of FCC censorship, to which the FCC appealed to
the Supreme Court. Id. at 733-34.
12 Id. at 751.
123 Id. at 748 (noting that because the broadcast audience is constantly tuning in and out,
prior warnings cannot completely protect the listener or viewer from unexpected program
content).
124 Id. The Court noted that each medium of expression presents special First
Amendment problems and that of all the forms of communication, broadcasting has
received the most limited First Amendment protection due to its pervasiveness and unique
accessibility. Id. at 748. The Court further noted that patently offensive, indecent material
presented over the airwaves "confronts the citizen," not only in public, but also in the
privacy of the home, where the individual has a higher expectation of privacy (thereby
distinguishing this case from Erznoznik). Id.
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in supporting parents' authority in their own households justified the
regulation of otherwise protected expression.1 25
Aside from shielding children from the speech at issue in the
preceding cases, the Court's jurisprudence has also tackled the issue of
children's rights when dealing with the controversial issue of child
pornography. 126 In New York v. Ferber,127 the Court upheld the conviction
of a bookstore proprietor under a New York statute that prohibited
persons from knowingly promoting a sexual performance by a child
under the age of sixteen by distributing material that depicted such a
performance.128 Although Ferber is not directly on point with the
previously discussed and subsequent protection of children cases in
which the government's aim was to shield children from a form of
expression, the Court in Ferber provides an example of how far the
government's protection of children can reach. The Court used Ferber as
another opportunity to recognize that the state's interest in safeguarding
the physical and psychological well-being of a minor is a compelling
interest.129 Relying on Prince and Ginsberg, the Court in Ferber noted that
the government may shut off all channels of child pornography because
it directly undermines the government's interest in protecting
children.130
12 Id. at 749. The Court further noted that the ease with which children may obtain
access to broadcast, coupled with the concerns recognized in Ginsberg, amply justified
special treatment of indecent broadcasting. Id.
126 See, e.g., L. Steven Grasz & Patrick J. Pfaltzgraff, Child Pornography and Child Nudity:
Mhy and How States May Constitutionally Regulate the Production, Possession, and Distribution
of Nude Visual Depictions of Children, 71 TEMP. L. REv. 609, 612-20 (1998) (discussing how the
physical and psychological effects child pornography has on children allows courts and
legislatures to regulate child pornography with a broad stroke of discretion under the
protection of children's interest).
127 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
128 Id. at 774. Article 263 of the New York Penal Law, cited by the Court, provided that
A person is guilty of the use of a child in a sexual performance if
knowing the character and content thereof he employs, authorizes or
induces a child less than sixteen years of age to engage in a sexual
performance or being a parent, legal guardian or custodian of such
child, he consents to the participation by such child in a sexual
performance.
Id. at 750-51 (citing N.Y. PENAL LAW § 263.05 (McKinney 1980)).
129 Id. at 756-57. The Court noted that the prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse of
children constituted a government objective of surpassing importance. Id.
130 Id. at 757. The Court, relying heavily on Prince, stated, "A democratic society rests, for
its continuance, upon the healthy, well-rounded growth of young people into full maturity
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Following Ferber, the Court's jurisprudence returned to
governmental attempts to shield children from a medium of expression
detrimental to their upbringing in Sable Communications v. FCC.131 Sable
involved the power of the FCC to regulate sexually oriented prerecorded
telephone messages (popularly known as "dial-a-porn"). 132 Once again,
the Court reaffirmed the compelling governmental interest in protecting
children. 133 However, the Court also noted that protection of children in
and of itself will not give the government carte blanche when it comes to
as citizens." Id. But see Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 122 S. Ct. 1389, 1401-02 (2002)
(holding that a government ban on virtual child pornography is distinguishable, and
thereby impermissible, from a ban on "regular" child pornography (i.e., the type of
pornography at issue in Ferber) since "regular" child pornography may be banned without
regard to whether it depicts works of value, whereas the virtual child pornography at issue
in Ashcroft is in a different category of speech).
131 492 U.S. 115 (1989) (providing a first glimpse of the Court's current logic regarding the
protection of children jurisprudence as well as what the Court will expect of a regulation
aimed at protecting children).
132 Id. at 117-18. The statute at issue in Sable was 47 U.S.C. § 223(b), an amendment to the
1934 Communications Act, which provided that
(2) Whoever knowingly -
(A) in the District of Columbia or in interstate or foreign
communications, by means of telephone, makes (directly or by
recording device) any obscene or indecent communication for
commercial purposes or any person, regardless of whether the maker
of such communication placed the call; or
(B) permits any telephone facility under such person's control to
be used for [obscene or indecent communication], shall be fined not
more than $ 50,000 or imprisoned not more than six months, or both.
Id. at 123 n.5 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 223(b) (1988)). Sable, arguing First Amendment and
overbreadth issues, challenged the FCC's power to regulate "dial-a-porn" under § 223(b)
and sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the FCC's enforcement of such
prohibitions. Id. at 118. Sable argued "that § 223(b) created an impermissible national
standard of obscenity," unlike the local standards called for in Miller, and "that it placed
message senders in a 'double bind' by compelling them to tailor all their messages to the
least tolerant community." Id. at 124. The FCC defended the prohibitions on "dial-a-porn"
as necessary to limit access of minors to such messages. Id. The district court upheld the
"dial-a-porn" prohibition against obscene interstate telephone communications for
commercial purposes but enjoined enforcement of amendments of the regulation insofar as
they applied to indecent messages. Id. at 118-19. On appeal, the Court held that, although
the FCC's prohibition of obscene telephone messages was constitutional in light of Miller,
the denial of adult access to "dial-a-porn" that was indecent but not obscene under the
Miller standard far exceeded that which was necessary to limit access of minors to such
messages and could not survive strict scrutiny with protection of children as its sole basis
for suppressing otherwise protected speech. Id. at 131 (holding that indecent
communications are protected by the First Amendment, unlike obscenity, which is
altogether unprotected).
133 Id.
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suppressing and regulating otherwise protected speech that adults may
want to access.134 The Court noted that the government must narrowly
draw its regulations without unnecessarily interfering with First
Amendment freedoms.135 Therefore, Sable represents the foundation for
modem jurisprudence regarding the protection of children because it is
the first in a line of cases to note that such regulations must typically
survive the most stringent form of constitutional scrutiny.136
In fact, the Court in recent times has been extremely reluctant to
uphold legislation aimed at the protection of children. 137 Many of the
new child protection laws have such broad and all-encompassing
reaches that, if upheld, they would not only shield children from access
but would also place substantial burdens on adult access as well, thereby
reducing the level of discourse to that which is fit for children only.138
The Court's reluctance to uphold legislation designed to protect
children was again displayed in Reno v. ACLU.139 In Reno, the Court
struck down portions of the 1996 Communications Decency Act
("CDA"), which attempted to prohibit any person or business from using
the Internet to display patently offensive material that could be easily
accessible to minors.140 The American Civil Liberties Union, on behalf of
134 Id. (noting that while the government has a legitimate interest in protecting children
from exposure to obscene and indecent "dial-a-porn" messages, § 223(b) was not
sufficiently narrowly drawn to serve that purpose and, thus, violated the First
Amendment).
135 Id. (noting that it is not enough to show that the government's ends are compelling-
the means must be carefully tailored to achieve those ends).
136 See infra Part III.B (analyzing the proper level of scrutiny to employ when dealing with
content-based regulations aimed at protecting children). As discussed in Part 11.B below,
the reason for the uncertainty as to what level of scrutiny to use when confronted with a
"protection of children" piece of legislation is attributed in large part to the fact that the
circuit courts have often relied on pre-Sable cases to reach their results and that the pre-
Sable cases, such as Ginsberg, were decided long before the Court had refined and
formulated its explicit levels of strict, intermediate, and rational basis scrutiny.
137 See infra notes 139-54 (discussing the Court's holdings and reasoning in Reno and
Playboy).
138 See, e.g., Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957).
139 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
140 Id. at 885. The portions of the Communications Decency Act ("CDA") at issue, 47
U.S.C. § 223(a) (Supp. II 1994), were known as the "indecent transmission" and "patently
offensive display" provisions and provided the following:
Whoever-
(1) in interstate or foreign communications-
(A) by means of a telecommunications device knowingly-
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a number of civil rights and computer groups, challenged the CDA on
First Amendment grounds.141
(i) makes, creates, or solicits, and
(ii) initiates the transmission of,
any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other
communication which is obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, or indecent,
with intent to annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass another person;
(B) by means of a telecommunications device knowingly-
(i) makes, creates, or solicits, and
(ii) initiates the transmission of,
any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other
communication which is obsene or indecent, knowing that the
recipient of the communication is under 18 years of age, regardless of
whether the maker of such communication placed the call or initiated
the communication;
(C) makes a telephone call or utilizes a telecommunications device,
whether or not conversation or communication ensures, without
disclosing his idnetify and with intent to annoy, abuse, threaten, or
harass any person at the called number or who receives the
communications;
(D) makes or causes the telephone of another repeatedly or
continuously to ring, with intent to harass any person at the called
number; or
(E) makes repeated telephone calls or repeatedly initiates
communication with a telecommunications device, during which
conversation or communication ensues, solely to harass any person at
the called number or who receives the communition; or
(2) knowingly permits any telecommunications facility under his
control to be used for any activity prohibited by paragraph (1) with the
intent that it be used for such activity,
shall be fined under Title 18, or imprisoned not more than two years,
or both.
47 U.S.C. § 223 (Supp. II 1994).
141 Reno, 521 U.S. at 861-62. The challenges occurred literally moments after President Bill
Clinton signed the CDA into law on February 8, 1996, and, in essence, these groups argued
that the inability of Internet users and providers to verify the age of information recipients
effectively prevented them from engaging in indecent speech, which traditionally has
received significant First Amendment protection. Id.; see also Eugene Volokh, Freedom of
Speech, Shielding Children, and Transcending Balancing, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 141, 141-43 (1997)
(providing the context under which the American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") and the
various groups tailored and based their claims upon). In response to the ACLU's charges,
the government, relying heavily on Ginsberg, argued that the government's compelling
interest in protecting children allowed the CDA to pass constitutional muster. Reno, 521
U.S. at 864. After a lengthy evidentiary hearing that included many on-line
demonstrations, a special three-judge district court (which was created by the CDA to hear
the expected constitutional challenges) agreed with the groups and ruled that the
provisions violated the First Amendment. Id. at 861-62. The three-judge panel struck
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The Supreme Court applied strict scrutiny to the CDA's content-
based restrictions and held that it abridged the First Amendment rights
of individuals on the Internet, notwithstanding the legitimacy and
importance of the compelling congressional goal of protecting children
from harmful Internet materials.142 First, the Court emphasized that the
regulation of such an elusive and amorphous entity as the Internet,
unlike the regulation or restriction of the "girlie" magazines in Ginsberg,
could not be justified with the protection of children as its primary or
sole basis.143 The Court noted that the suppression of speech on the
Internet poses a problem, since it is undoubtedly difficult, if not
impossible, to discern whether a minor or an adult is accessing the
questionable material. 44
The government argued that the CDA was comparable to the
Ginsberg statute because both were aimed at the protection of children,
but the Court did not accept this argument and instead held that the
overlapping similarity between the two was minimal at best.145 Thus,
the Court in Reno suggested that the reach of Ginsberg is viewed rather
strictly and cannot be extended arbitrarily to any and all regulations
aimed at the protection of children. 46 Rather, the current Court will
probably require a regulation relying on Ginsberg for justification to be
nearly identical to the statute upheld in Ginsberg.147
down the CDA on vagueness and overbreadth grounds and also noted that the CDA swept
more broadly than necessary for the government's protection of the interests of children,
which thereby "chill[ed] the expression of adults." Id. at 862.
142 Id. at 874.
143 Id. at 855-57.
144 Id.
145 Id. at 864-66. The Court cited four main reasons why Ginsberg and Reno could not be
compared: (1) unlike in Ginsberg, where the prohibition against the sales to minors did not
bar parents who so desired to purchase the "girlie" magazines for their children, the CDA
did not contain such a "loop-hole;" (2) the Ginsberg statute applied only to commercial
transactions, whereas the CDA contained no such limitation; (3) the Ginsberg statute's
definition of "harmful to minors" was narrowed to materials "utterly without redeeming
social importance for minors," whereas the CDA was vague in terms of what the
"indecent" and "patently offensive" material was that it attempted to regulate; and (4) the
age in the Ginsberg statute for what constituted a "minor" was seventeen, whereas the
CDA defined a minor as anyone under eighteen. Id.
146 Id. at 864-68.
147 See id.
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Finally, in United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc.,148 the
Court considered provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996,
which required cable television operators to "fully scramble or otherwise
fully block the video and audio portion" of channels that provide
primarily "sexually explicit adult programming" in order to avoid the
problem of "signal bleeds" occurring on non-subscribers' televisions. 149
Playboy brought suit challenging the constitutionality of section 505 on
the grounds that it was a content-based law violative of the First
Amendment. 150
The Court, applying strict scrutiny, held that section 505 was an
invalid content-based regulation that was not the least restrictive means
of protecting children from "signal bleeds." 151 The crux of the Court's
reasoning was that, when the designed benefit of a content-based speech
restriction is to shield the sensibilities of listeners, the general rule is that
the right of expression prevails even if a less restrictive alternative does
not exist152 Further, the Court noted that the objective of shielding
children did not suffice to allow a "blanket" ban on indecent
programming, since the government had little or no hard evidence
148 529 U.S. 803 (2000).
149 Id. at 827-28. In the Appendix to the Court's opinion, the Court cited the following
portions of section 505 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996:
(a) Requirement
In providing sexually explicit adult programming or other
programming that is indecent on any channel of its service primarily
dedicated to sexually-oriented programming, a multichannel video
programming distributor shall fully scramble or otherwise fully block
the video and audio portion of such channel so that one not a
subscriber to such channel or programming does not receive it.
(b) Implementation
Until a multichannel video programming distributor complies with the
requirement set forth in subsection (a) of this section, the distributor
shall limit the access of children to the programming ... by not
providing such programming during the hours of the day (as
determined by the [FCC]) when a significant number of children are
likely to view it.
47 U.S.C. § 561 (Supp. III 1994).
150 Playboy, 529 U.S. at 807. In response to Playboy's challenge, the government argued
that section 505 was enacted under the government's compelling interest of protecting
children from indecent broadcasts of this sexually-oriented programming. Id. The district
court agreed with Playboy and held that section 505 violated the First Amendment. Id. at
810.
151 Id. at 827.
152 Id. at 813.
A.: Is Violence Really Just Fun and Games?:  A Proposal for a Violent
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2002
460 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW [Vol.37
regarding the impact "signal bleeds" have on the upbringing of
children. 153 Regarding the potential for future regulations aimed at
suppressing otherwise protected speech, the Court noted that "[i]t is rare
that a regulation restricting speech because of its content will ever be
permissible," even when the protection of children is the government's
compelling interest.1l 4
The framework established by the Court in these cases clearly
demonstrates that strict scrutiny applies to content-based regulations
aimed at protecting minors.155 Nevertheless, some have argued that the
circuits have divided into three groups regarding the proper standard to
employ. 5 6 Regardless, as these key cases in the Court's jurisprudence
have illustrated, the government faces an uphill battle when it attempts
to justify its compelling interest in protecting children by suppressing
speech that would otherwise be permissible15 7
C. The Regulation of Entertainment Industries and the First Amendment
1. The Regulation of Entertainment Under the First Amendment and
Self-Regulation by the Entertainment Industry
The Court has noted that certain forms of "entertainment
expression" can convey a speech message, although the "speech" is
typically presented for leisure and enjoyment purposes only. 58
153 Id. at 819.
154 Id. The Court further added that "[tihe history of free expression is one of vindication
in cases involving speech that many citizens may find shabby, offensive, or even ugly." Id.
at 826.
15 See, e.g., id. at 813.
156 See infra Part III.B (assessing the alleged disagreement on the standard of review used
among the circuits). The standard of review discussion in Part III.B of this Note clearly
illustrates that the advocates' and commentators' arguments that there is a "circuit split" is
misplaced and misguided. See infra Part III.B.
157 See, e.g., Playboy, 529 U.S. at 847 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that where the
protection of children is at issue, the First Amendment poses a barrier that properly is high,
but not insurmountable).
158 Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 496, 501 (1952) (concluding that motion
pictures are afforded First Amendment protection since they are "organ[s] of public
opinion" as well as a "significant medium for the communication of ideas" with the
potential of affecting public attitudes and behavior in political and social discourse). Joseph
Burstyn, Inc. represents one of the Court's first, and often relied upon, statements regarding
the assessment of whether a form of entertainment is afforded First Amendment protection
and considered "speech" under the clause. Id. In Joseph Burstyn, Inc., the Court also noted
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Regardless, there is no type of blanket protection afforded to all of the
different entertainment genres.15 9 Instead, each form of entertainment
must be assessed based on its own particular form and content.160 This is
because "[t]he line between the informing and the entertaining is
[generally] too elusive for the protection of [First Amendment rights] ...
[w]hat is one man's amusement, teaches another's doctrine."161 Thus, in
order for the government to determine whether it will have to meet First
Amendment standards when regulating a particular form of
entertainment in the interest of protecting children, it must first
determine whether the entertainment at issue is regarded as "speech"
within the meaning of the First Amendment.162
In addition to the government being cognizant of the need to
regulate forms of entertainment that may be harmful to minors, many
entertainment industries have also imposed self-regulation systems.163
In general, a self-regulation system consists of three components: (1)
legislation that defines appropriate rules; (2) enforcement, such as
initiating actions against violators; and (3) adjudication that decides
whether a violation has taken place and imposes an appropriate
sanction.164 However, imposition of a self-regulation scheme by an
industry does not mean that the government may not interject and
that there is a "blurred line" between what can be considered "purely entertainment"
(which would be afforded no First Amendment protection) and "protected speech." Id.
159 See generally Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 65 (1981) (stating
broadly that entertainment speech is protected and that "motion pictures, programs
broadcast by radio and television, and live entertainment, such as musicals and dramatic
works, fall within the First Amendment guarantee").
160 Joseph Burstyn, Inc., 343 U.S. at 501.
161 Id.
162 Id.; see also infra Part III.A (discussing whether video games should be regarded as a
form of speech under the First Amendment).
163 See Angela J. Campbell, Self-Regulation and the Media, 51 FED. COMM. L.J. 711, 714-20
(1999). Campbell notes that in order to devise a definition of what constitutes self-
regulation, one has to break apart the term "self-regulation." Id. at 714-15. In breaking self-
regulation apart, Campbell states,
The word "self" refers to the actor. It could mean a single company.
More commonly, however, ... it is used to refer to a group of
companies acting collectively, for example, through a trade association.
The word "regulation" refers to what the actor is doing....
Thus, the term "self-regulation" means that the industry or
profession rather than the government is doing the regulation.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
164 Id.
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impose regulations of its own on the industries.165  Instead, the
government and an industry can work collectively on these three
components, or the government can sometimes mandate that an industry
adopt and enforce a code of self-regulation.166
As these regulatory parameters indicate, regulation of the
entertainment industry by either the government, the industry, or the
government and the industry collectively, depends on whether the
content is regarded as speech under the First Amendment and, if so,
under what type of regulatory system it operates.
2. History of the Regulation of Video Games
In examining the regulation of video games, it becomes apparent
that this is an area of the law that has evolved in conjunction with
technological developments. 167 Regulation of video games did not
predominantly arise until the early 1980s.168 During this time, the
reviewing courts noted that such regulations did not involve First
165 Id. at 715-16.
166 Id. at 715. Campbell notes, for example, that "an industry may be involved at the
legislation stage by developing a code of practice, while leaving enforcement to the
government, or the government may establish regulations, but delegate enforcement to the
private sector." Id. See generally IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION:
TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 103-05 (1992). Ayres and Braithwaite view self-
regulation as a form of "sub-contracting" regulatory functions to private actors. Id. at 103.
The classic example of self-regulation on entertainment is the rating system the Motion
Picture Association of America ("MPAA") has in order to provide clear parameters of what
films are suitable for particular age groups. Campbell, supra note 163, at 750-52; see also
Richard P. Salgado, Regulating a Video Revolution, 7 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 516, 519-20 (1989)
(describing the MPAA rating scheme and how films are rated).
167 John E. Sullivan, Note, First Amendment Protection of Artistic Entertainment: Toward
Reasonable Municipal Regulation of Video Games, 36 VAND. L. REV. 1223, 1225-27 (1983). Video
games in their early forms with primitive graphics and story lines in games such as Pongo,
an electronic version of table tennis created in 1972, were not sought to be regulated by
jurisdictions. Id. at 1225-26. Rather, local governments did not attempt to exert their
influence over video games until the early 1980s, when the video game industry became a
billion-dollar industry and the games had developed into colorful, graphic, and thematic
displays of moving images. Id. at 1226-27.
16 William Dobreff, Video Games Wars: Arcades v. City Licensing Laws, 1983 DET. C. L. REV.
103, 104-05 (1983) (illustrating that as a result of the video game industry becoming one of
the most profitable forms of entertainment in the 1980s, local governmental officials
responded resoundingly by enacting or amending municipal ordinances so that video
games could come within their reach of regulation).
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Amendment protections. 69 A majority of these regulations in the 1980s
and early 1990s were blanket, content-neutral bans in which the
government prohibited the use of the games during certain time periods
for delinquency and truancy reasons wholly unrelated to any speech
element of the games.170
However, the courts eventually began to recognize the possibility
that video games may have evolved and developed enough to fall within
the ambit of protected expression under the First Amendment. 171
169 Am.'s Best Family Showplace Corp. v. City of New York, 536 F. Supp. 170, 173-74
(E.D.N.Y. 1982) (concluding that video games were "pure entertainment" not protected by
the First Amendment because there was no "element of information or some idea being
communicated"); Kaye v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n, Westport, 472 A.2d 809, 810-12
(Conn. Super. Ct. 1983) (noting that, "although entertainment may come within the ambit
of First Amendment protection, to gain protected status, the entertainment must be
designed to communicate or express some idea or some information," which video games
do not); Marshfield Family Skateland, Inc. v. Town of Marshfield, 450 N.E.2d 605, 609-10
(Mass. 1983) (rejecting plaintiffs' First Amendment challenge to town's total prohibition on
coin-activated amusement device, including video games in particular); Warren v. Walker,
354 N.W.2d 312, 316-17 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984) (noting that the communicative elements of
playing video games are not entitled to First Amendment protection since "any
communication or expression of ideas that occurs during the playing of a video game is
purely inconsequential"); St. Louis v. Kiely, 652 S.W.2d 694, 697 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983)
(holding that coin-operated video games, being pure entertainment with no informational
element, cannot be "characterized as a form of speech protected by the First Amendment").
170 Rothner v. City of Chicago, 929 F.2d 297, 303-04 (7th Cir. 1991) (upholding a city
ordinance prohibiting minors under seventeen years of age from playing video games
during school hours as a valid content-neutral time, place, and manner regulation); Shorez
v. City of Dacono, 574 F. Supp. 130, 133 (D. Colo. 1983) (holding that an ordinance
providing that no person under the age of sixteen shall be allowed by a licensee to play or
operate any coin-operated game, machine, or device during school hours, unless
accompanied by a parent or guardian, was specifically tailored to achieve asserted interest
in preventing truancy and, thus, did not violate Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses);
Pecoraro v. City of Buffalo, 447 N.Y.S.2d 842, 845 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982) (holding that a
municipal ordinance prohibiting persons under sixteen from entering an amusement
arcade did not deprive those sixteen and under from equal protection of the laws under the
Fourteenth Amendment).
171 See infra Part III.A (discussing whether the Supreme Court would hold that video
games are afforded First Amendment protection); see also Caswell v. Licensing Comm'n,
444 N.E.2d 922,926-927 (Mass. 1983) (noting that, in the future, video games could possibly
be afforded First Amendment protection if they contain sufficient communicative and
expressive elements); Tommy & Tina Inc. v. Dep't of Consumer Affairs, 459 N.Y.S.2d 220,
226-27 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983) (stating that, although the games at issue in the case were not
protected speech, "games ... of a different nature" may one day be entitled to First
Amendment protection as "speech" and not "pure entertainment"); see also David B.
Goroff, Note, The First Amendment Side Effects of Curing Pac-Man Fever, 84 COLUM. L. REv.
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Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has yet to face the issue squarely, and
many lower courts and judges regard video games as falling into a "gray
area" of speech that may have some First Amendment protection but is
nevertheless an "outer ambit" of speech, allowing the government
greater freedom to regulate.172
Although there is no consensus on whether regulating video games
must satisfy First Amendment standards, the coin-operated video game
industry has implemented an intricate system of self-regulation for
games placed in arcades and other establishments based largely on the
type of video game and the content of the message that the game
conveys. 173 Of particular importance in the regulation of video games
are those regulations aimed at the violent content in video games.
744, 764-65 (1984) (arguing that video games are "imbued with elements of
communication" since they employ plots, themes, and characters).
17 See, e.g., Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1098-99 (7th Cir. 1990) (en
banc) (Posner, J., concurring). In his opinion in Miller, Judge Posner noted that
There are some clearly expressive activities and some clearly
nonexpressive ones but there is also a vast gray area populated by ...
creators of video games, ... and so on without end. The government
has a greater scope for regulation in the gray area. Maybe, indeed, that
area could be regarded as outside the boundaries of the First
Amendment (de minimis non curat lex), in which event the only
constitutional constraints would be those very loose ones that the Due
Process Clause places on harmless liberties not involving the exercise
of freedom of expression.
Id.
173 American Amusement Machine Association, Coin-Operated Video Game Parental
Advisory System, available at http://www.coin-op.org/pas.htm (last visited Sept. 2, 2002)
[hereinafter Coin-Operated Video Game Parental Advisory System]. In response to a request by
the United States Congress, the coin-operated industry implemented regulations based on
a "sticker" system in which video games in arcades and other places of business have one
of three types of colored stickers affixed to the video machine that serve as a "Disclosure
Message" regarding the content of the game: (1) red stickers for games containing strong
animated violence, strong life-like violence, strong language, or strong sexual content; (2)
yellow stickers for games containing mild animated violence, mild life-like violence, mild
language, or mild sexual content; and (3) green stickers for games whose content is
appropriate for game players of all ages. Id. This sticker system is primarily a parental
advisory system, thereby leaving the ultimate determination of whether a minor will play a
particular game to the parent. Id. Therefore, the system is primarily advisory in nature
and is the video game industry's attempt to curb the potential harmful effects video games
can have on children. Id.; see also American Amusement Machine Association, Guidelines for
Game Ratings, available at http://www.coin-op.org/guidelines-forgame-ratings.htm (last
visited Sept. 2, 2002). The American Amusement Machine Association also provides a
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nine-step process to determine whether a game should be regulated under the green,
yellow, or red categories stated above:
GUIDELINES FOR RATING GAMES
LANGUAGE
1. Does the game contain strong four-letter expletives?
If YES, this game should have a Disclosure Message of "Language-
Strong" [a red sticker game]; proceed to question #3.
If NO, proceed to question #2.
2. Does the game contain commonly used four-letter words (e.g. hell,
danm, etc)?
If YES, this game should have a Disclosure Message of "Language-
Mild" [a yellow sticker game]; proceed to question #3.
If NO, proceed to question #3.
SEXUAL CONTENT
3. Does the game contain depictions of sexual behavior and/or the
human body?
If YES, this game should have a Disclosure Message of "Sexual
Content-Strong" [a red sticker game]; proceed to question #5.
If NO, proceed to question #4.
4. Does the game contain sexually suggestive references of material?
If YES, this game should have a Disclosure Message of "Sexual
Content-Mild" [a yellow sticker game]; proceed to question #5.
If NO, proceed to question #5.
VIOLENCE
5. Does this game contain scenes involving human-like characters
engaged in combative activity, which results in bloodshed, serious
injury and/or death to depicted character(s)?
If YES, this game should have a Disclosure Message of "Life-Like
Violence-Strong"[a red sticker game]; skip questions 6-8 and fill in the
appropriate Disclosure Message in Section III.
If NO, proceed to question #6.
6. Does this game contain scenes involving human-like characters
engaged in combative activity such as martial arts or sports activities
with violent elements that do [not] result in bloodshed, serious injury
and/or death to the depicted character(s)?
If YES, this game should have a Disclosure Message of "Life-Like
Violence-Mild" [a yellow sticker game]; skip questions 7-8 and fill in
the appropriate Disclosure Message in Section III.
If NO, proceed to question #7.
7. Does this game contain scenes involving cartoon-life [sic] characters
in fantasy or life-like settings, which results in bloodshed, serious
injury and/or death to the depicted character(s)?
If YES, this game should have a Disclosure Message of "Animated
Violence-Strong" [a red sticker game]; skip question 8 and fill in the
appropriate Disclosure Message in Section III.
If NO, proceed to question #8.
8. Does this game contain scenes involving cartoon-like characters in
fantasy or life-like settings engaged in combative activity such as
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3. The Regulation of Violent Video Games: An In-Depth Examination
of the Indianapolis Ordinance
In general, regulation of video games and other forms of
entertainment based on their violent content has not fared well in the
courts. This is primarily owed to vague or overbroad definitions of
"violence." 174 Typically, the courts are presented with a regulation
aimed at restricting violent material based on a statutory scheme
patterned after the Miller obscenity standard.175 These regulations will
typically substitute the obscenity-tailored language of Miller to meet
their regulation of violence.1 76
The Indianapolis Ordinance was drafted precisely in this manner.177
If it had gone into effect, the Indianapolis Ordinance would have
forbidden any operator of five or more video game machines in one
place to allow a minor unaccompanied by a parent, guardian, or other
martial arts or sports activities with violent elements that do not result
in bloodshed, serious injury and/or death to the depicted character(s)?
If YES, this game should have a Disclosure Message of "Animated
Violence-Mild" [a yellow sticker game]; skip question #9 and fill in the
appropriate Disclosure Message in Section Il.
If NO, proceed to question #9.
SUITABLE FOR ALL AGES
9. If the answers to all questions above have been NO, your game
should have a Disclosure Message of "Suitable for All Ages" [a green
sticker game].
Guidelines for Game Ratings, supra.
174 See generally Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 519-20 (1948) (striking down as vague
a complete ban on adults' and children's stories involving "bloodshed," "lust," or "crime");
Sovereign News Co. v. Falke, 448 F. Supp. 306 (N.D. Ohio 1977) (holding unconstitutional
on overbreadth grounds a statute restricting the depiction of extreme or bizarre violence,
cruelty, or brutality); Davis-Kidd Booksellers, Inc. v. McWherter, 866 S.W.2d 520 (Tenn.
1993) (holding unconstitutional and void for vagueness a state statute restricting display of
"excess violence" materials for the protection of minors).
175 See, e.g., Sovereign News Co., 448 F. Supp. at 394 (noting that "only material that depicts
or describes sexual conduct can be regulated because it is obscene" and that material
"containing violence, brutality or cruelty cannot be considered obscene unless it also
contains depictions or descriptions of sexual conduct").
176 Id.; see also Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). Such a flawed system is clearly
in need of evaluation and redirection, which is precisely what this Note does. See infra Part
III.C.
Mz Indianapolis, Ind., Ordinance No. 72, 2000 (July 17, 2000). The ordinance's "harmful
to minors" and graphic violence definitions are clearly patterned after Miller. Id.; supra note
10; see also Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
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custodian to use a video game machine that is harmful to minors.178
Further, it would have required appropriate warning signs, that the
violent video games be separated by a partition from the other machines
in the location, and that their viewing areas be concealed from persons
on the other side of the partition. 179 Operators of fewer than five games
in one location, referred to as "exhibitors" in the ordinance, 180 were to be
subject to all but the partitioning restriction.'8' Monetary penalties, as
178 Indianapolis, Ind., Ordinance No. 72, 2000; supra note 10 (quoting the ordinance's
definition of "harmful to minors").
179 Indianapolis, Ind., Ordinance No. 72, 2000, § 2.
(i) It shall be unlawful for a registrant to operate an amusement
location unless each amusement machine that is harmful to minors in
the amusement location displays a conspicuous sign indicating that the
machine may not be operated by a minor under eighteen (18) years of
age unless the minor is accompanied by his or her parent, guardian, or
custodian. If amusement machines that are harmful to minors are
displayed together in an area separate from amusement machines that
are not harmful, a single conspicuous sign in that area or at the
entrance to that area may be used to mark the group of machines for
purposes of this subsection.
() It shall be unlawful for a registrant to make available to
patrons any amusement machine that is harmful to minors within ten
(10) feet of an amusement machine that is not harmful. It shall further
be unlawful for a registrant not to separate amusement machines that
are harmful to minors from other machines by some form of partition,
divider, drape, barrier, panel, screen, or wall that completely obstructs
the view of persons outside the partitioned area of the playing surface
or display screen of the machines that are harmful to minors. It shall
be unlawful for a registrant, registrant's agent, or employee of an
amusement location to allow a minor who is not accompanied by his
or her parent, guardian, or custodian into the partitioned area.
Id.
180 Id. § 1.
Exhibitor means a person who owns or operates a place of
business in the city where four (4) or fewer amusement machines are
located; however, the provisions of this chapter shall not apply to an
exhibitor's place of business which is licensed ... for the sale of
alcoholic beverages and where entry is limited to persons who are
eighteen (18) years of age or older.
Id.
181 Id. § 3.
(f) It shall be unlawful for an exhibitor, an exhibitor's agent, or an
exhibitor's employee knowingly to allow a minor who is not
accompanied by the minor's parent, guardian or custodian to operate
in the exhibitor's place of business an amusement machine that is
harmful to minors.
A.: Is Violence Really Just Fun and Games?:  A Proposal for a Violent
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2002
468 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW [Vol.37
well as suspension and revocation of the right to operate the machines,
were specified as penalties for violations of the ordinance. 82
Other jurisdictions followed Indianapolis' lead and proposed, and
continue to propose, the enactment of similar ordinances.183 Regardless
(g) It shall be unlawful for an exhibitor to make available to
patrons in his or her place of business amusement machines that are
harmful to minors unless each amusement machine that is harmful to
minors displays a conspicuous sign indicating that the machine may
not be operated by a minor under eighteen (18) years of age unless the
minor is accompanied by his or her parent, guardian, or custodian. If
amusement machines that are harmful to minors are displayed
together in an area separate from amusement machines that are not
harmful, a single conspicuous sign in that area or at the entrance to
that area may be used to mark the group of machines for purposes of
this subsection.
(h) It shall be unlawful for an exhibitor to make available to
patrons any amusement machine that is harmful to minors within ten
feet of an amusement machine that is not harmful. It shall further be
unlawful for an exhibitor, exhibitor's agent, or exhibitor's employee to
allow a minor who is not accompanied by his or her parent, guardian,
or custodian to view, with the exception of an incidental view, the
playing surface or screen of a game that is harmful to minors.
Id.
182 Id. § 6.
A person who violates any provision of this chapter shall be
punishable as provided in section 103-3 of the Code; provided,
however, the fine imposed for such violation shall not be less than two
hundred dollars ($200.00), that for the purpose of assessing fines no
more than one violation shall be deemed to have occurred on any one
day, and that each day that an offense continues shall constitute a
separate violation. The fines assessed for violations of this chapter
shall be deposited with the law enforcement agency that caused the
violation to be filed, if any.
Id.
183 See generally H.B. 1025, 83d Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2001) (requiring the rating of
interactive video games and establishing a criminal offense for the selling or furnishing of
violent interactive video games to minors); A.B. 40, 2001-02 Assem., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2002)
(requiring that each amusement machine in arcade facilities be labeled with a rating
category indicating the notice of its content and that machines with graphic violence be
located in a separate area in the arcade); S. 119, 2001 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2001)
(prohibiting certain business owners from allowing people under eighteen to operate a
"violent point and shoot video simulator"); H.B. 663, 18th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Fla.
2002) (restricting the use of video games rated for mature audiences to adults or minors
accompanied by an adult); H.B. 1378, 146th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2002) (establishing
the "Violent Video Game Protection Act" prohibiting the sale or rental for use for a charge
any video game to a minor which contains scenes or depictions of graphic violence); H.B.
1649, 112th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2001) (requiring an establishment that possesses
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of the current interest by legislators in regulating violent video games in
a similar manner as Indianapolis. These legislators cannot follow the
Indianapolis model in "lock-stop" fashion, given that the Seventh Circuit
ultimately struck down the Indianapolis Ordinance.1 4
amusement machines harmful to minors to conspicuously post signs on each machine
stating that minors may not operate the machine unless accompanied by a parent,
guardian, or custodian and separate, by at least ten feet, amusement machines harmful to
minors from other amusement machines); S. 530, 91st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2001)
(prohibiting any person from selling or renting a "restricted" violent video game to a
person who is less than seventeen years of age); H.B. 2310, 82d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2001)
(banning the sale or rental of violent video games to people under seventeen and
prohibiting the public showing, display, or other exhibition of violent video games); S.
2048, 2002 Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2002) (prohibiting the dissemination of violent video games to
people under eighteen); A. 09019, 224th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2001) (restricting persons
under eighteen from operating a violent point and shoot video simulator on premises
where video games are provided for entertainment); A. 2849, 209th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J.
2001) (restricting persons seventeen and under from operating video game machines that
display harmful and violent graphics); S. 1745, 209th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2001) (requiring
that businesses that sell and rent violent video games at retail do so in accordance with the
age-based ratings of the Entertainment Software Ratings Board); S. 757, 48th Leg., 1st Sess.
(Okla. 2001) (prohibiting selling or renting video games with high-violence content to
persons under seventeen); H.R. 21, 71st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2001) (requiring that rating
stickers produced for coin-operated amusement industry's Coin-Operated Video Game
Parental Advisory system be prominently displayed on video game machines); H.B. 2363,
57th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2002) (providing that a "person who sells, rents, or permits to
be sold or rented, any violent video or computer game to any minor is guilty of a
misdemeanor, punishable under [state law]"); Honolulu, Haw., Bill 89, 2000, A Bill for an
Ordinance Relating to Violence (regulating the availability of an interactive electronic game
that is excessively and realistically violent to a person under eighteen); St. Louis County,
Mo., Ordinance No. 20,193 (Oct. 26, 2000) (imposing criminal penalties on the distribution
of certain video games, including both arcade-style and home games, based solely on their
alleged "graphically violent" content). As was the case with the ordinances prior to
Indianapolis, these ordinances are either awaiting approval by their respective legislators
or have not been acted upon further. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
184 See supra note 14 and accompanying text. As this Note discussed previously, St. Louis
County, Mo., Ordinance No. 20,193 (Oct. 26, 2000) was recently upheld by the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. Interactive Digital Software Ass'n v. St.
Louis County, Mo., 200 F. Supp. 2d 1126, 1141 (E.D. Mo. 2002). At the time this Note is
being published, the St. Louis County Council members have not reached a consensus as to
whether they will enforce the ordinance in light of the appeal being filed by the Interactive
Digital Software Association in the action. See supra note 14 and accompanying text
(discussing, inter alia, the uncertainty and reluctance of the St. Louis County Council with
regards to the future of their ordinance).
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4. American Amusement Machine Ass'n v. Kendrick: The "Test Case" for
How Ordinances Aimed at Restricting Minors' Access to Violent and
Sexually Explicit Video Games Have Faired in the Courts
In applying the above-mentioned principles and premises for violent
video game regulations, video game and entertainment industry
advocates brought a First Amendment challenge to the Indianapolis
Ordinance before the statute took effect in American Amusement Machine
Ass'n v. Kendrick.185  The district court upheld the ordinance as a
constitutionally permissible exercise of police power based on the
government's compelling interest in protecting children.186 At the outset,
the district court held that at least some modem video games, including
those at issue in the case, should be afforded First Amendment
protection.187 The district court, in a lengthy discussion based heavily on
Ginsberg, examined the ordinance in light of the competing interests of
children, video game manufacturers, and the city's compelling interest in
protecting children and ultimately arrived at the conclusion that the
balance tipped in the city's favor.188
When the manufacturers and trade association appealed the denial
of the preliminary injunction, the Seventh Circuit, in a unanimous
opinion, struck down the ordinance as violating both the game
manufacturers' and the affected children's First Amendment rights. 189
The Seventh Circuit agreed with the district court and found that video
games, including violent ones, are speech protected by the First
Amendment. 90 One of Indianapolis' main arguments was that violence
185 115 F. Supp. 2d 943 (S.D. Ind. 2000), rev'd, 244 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2001). The plaintiff
video game manufacturers and their trade association brought an action in federal district
court and moved for a preliminary injunction to prevent the enforcement of the
Indianapolis Ordinance. Id. at 945-46.
186 Id. at 955-76.
187 Id. at 954. "Based on the evidence in this record, the court finds that at least some
contemporary video games include protected forms of expression. " Id.
18 Id. The District Court further noted that
It would be an odd conception of the First Amendment and "variable
obscenity" that would allow a state to prevent a boy from purchasing a
magazine containing pictures of topless women ... as in Ginsberg, but
give that same boy a constitutional right to train to become a sniper at
the local arcade without his parent's permission.
Id. at 981.
189 Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n, 244 F.3d at 572, 580.
19 Id. at 574.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 37, No. 1 [2002], Art. 14
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol37/iss1/14
2002] FUN AND GAMES 471
should be treated like obscenity. 191 The Seventh Circuit dismissed this
argument rather easily and noted that, instead of the obscenity standard,
the appropriate method of review was strict scrutiny.192 The Seventh
Circuit further reasoned that exposure to violent images is something
that minors should not be shielded from until they turn eighteen since it
would "not only be quixotic, but deforming" to leave a minor
unequipped to cope with the harsh reality of a culture in which violence
has become a permanent fixture.193 Additionally, the Seventh Circuit
noted that violent video games in arcades and other establishments are
only "a tiny fraction of the media violence to which minors are
exposed." 194 As a last point, the Seventh Circuit resoundingly rejected
Indianapolis' argument that the ordinance could be upheld in light of
Ginsberg by concluding that the two cases are different because Ginsberg
involved "adult invasion" of children's culture with the "girlie"
magazines, whereas violent video games are accepted as a form of
speech in the "age-old children's literature on violent themes."195
Following the Seventh Circuit's decision, Indianapolis filed a petition
to the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.196 Ultimately, however, the
Supreme Court denied certiorari.197 The Court's action, coupled with the
lack of explanation by the Seventh Circuit as to why these ordinances
cannot pass constitutional muster, has provided little or no guidance for
191 Id.
192 Id. "[Tihe City asks us to squeeze the provision on violence into a familiar legal
pigeonhole, that of obscenity, which is normally concerned with sex and is not protected by
the First Amendment .... Violence and obscenity are distinct categories of objectionable
depiction." Id.
193 Id. at 577-78. "[Tlhe right of parents to enlist the aid of the state to shield their
children from ideas of which the parents disapprove cannot be plenary .... People are
unlikely to become well-functioning, independent-minded adults .. , if they are raised in
an intellectual bubble." Id. at 577.
194 Id.
195 Id. at 578. The court expounded on this point by stating that
These games with their cartoon characters and stylized mayhem are
continuous with an age-old children's literature on violent themes.
The exposure of children to the "girlie" magazines involved in the
Ginsberg case was not. It seemed obvious to the Supreme Court that
these magazines were an adult invasion of children's culture and
parental prerogatives. No such argument is available here.
Id.
1% See Certiorari Petition, supra note 89, at 25-28.
197 534 U.S. 994 (2001).
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the other jurisdictions considering such an ordinance. 198 Furthermore, as
this historical discussion illustrates, the lack of recent case law in the area
of video games has left many issues in need of clarification before such
an ordinance can be crafted to withstand the constitutional challenges
faced by Indianapolis.
III. CURRENT PROBLEMS FACING AN ATtEMPT TO PROTECT MINORS BY
REGULATING VIOLENT VIDEO GAMES
A. The Threshold Issue: Are Video Games Protected Speech Under the First
Amendment?
American Amusement Machine Ass'n is the only case dealing with a
violent video game ordinance that has explicitly held that video games
are speech within the meaning of the First Amendment.199 The Supreme
Court has not dealt squarely with this issue.200 As a result, cases from
the 1980s and early 1990s and a recent decision by the District Court for
the Eastern District of Missouri in Interactive Digital Software Ass'n v. St.
Louis County, Missouri, where video games were held to be "purely
entertainment," may provide some guidance.2 1 On the other hand, one
198 Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n, 244 F.3d at 580. The only "words of wisdom" the
Seventh Circuit provided for the other jurisdictions contemplating the enactment of such
an ordinance was that "a more narrowly drawn ordinance might survive a constitutional
challenge." Id. Therefore, a statement such as this, which appears for the most part to be
self-evident, provides little or no guidance for how a jurisdiction can go about drafting
such an ordinance to survive a First Amendment challenge.
199 Cf. Wilson v. Midway Games, Inc., 198 F. Supp. 2d 167, 179-80 (D. Conn. 2002) (noting
that the interactive video game was expression protected by the First Amendment,
precluding an action by a mother, whose son was murdered by a friend allegedly addicted
to and obsessed with the game, against the manufacturer for negligent and intentional
infliction of emotional distress under Connecticut law); Sanders v. Acclaim Entm't, Inc., 188
F. Supp. 2d 1264, 1279-80 (D. Colo. 2002) (noting that video games are entitled to full First
Amendment protection). As discussed previously, Wilson and Sanders dealt with the issue
of holding game manufacturers and movie producers liable as the proximate cause in the
death of individuals at school-shootings at the hand of students "addicted" to video games.
See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
200 City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283 (1982). The Court has only
remotely faced a video game ordinance once, and on that occasion, the issue was of due
process and not the arcade owners' First Amendment rights. Id. at 286-87.
201 See supra notes 14, 169-70 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which various
courts have held that video games should not be subject to the rigors of the First
Amendment); see also Interactive Digital Software Ass'n v. St. Louis County, Mo., 200 F.
Supp. 2d 1126, 1135 (E.D. Mo. 2002) (holding that video games are not protected speech
under the First Amendment and that plaintiffs had failed to meet their burden of showing
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can also look to the arguments raised in secondary sources for
guidance202 and the brief statement in American Amusement Machine Ass'n
that construes games as protected speech.203 Either way, guidance is
needed regarding which standard of review will apply. In making this
determination, an examination of video games as they currently exist is
helpful.
Video games have evolved immensely from their primitive days in
the 1970s and 1980s when games had no story lines and were solely
meant to leisurely entertain and amuse the player.2°4 Conversely, the
games of the modem era, while still entertaining and amusing, include
intricate plot lines and character development akin to motion pictures.205
Because of this, today's video games are more "imbued with elements of
communication" than the video games that existed when the cases in the
1980s were decided.206 Further, today's game makers intend to convey a
that video games are a protected form of speech under the First Amendment). This
holding by the district court in Interactive Digital Software Ass'n is in direct conflict with the
Seventh Circuit and Southern District of Indiana's respective holdings in the American
Amusement Machine Ass'n v. Kendrick case. See supra Part II.C.4 (discussing the Seventh
Circuit and district court's holdings in American Amusement Machine Ass'n). Aside from
this disagreement, the district court's opinion should not be regarded as holding much
water and precedential value since its holding that games are not speech is based solely on
four video games it reviewed, which were presented to the court by St. Louis County.
Interactive Digital Software Ass'n, 200 F. Supp. 2d at 1135. Thus, the district court's holding
in Interactive Digital Software Ass'n is making a broad and general "knee-jerk" proclamation
based on four particular video games. Such a general holding should not be based on a
examination of a small fraction of the entertainment industry at issue.
202 See supra notes 171-72 and accompanying text (examinging arguments as to why video
games should be considered "speech" under the First Amendment).
203 Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n, 244 F.3d at 574.
204 See, e.g., John Skow, Games That Play People, TIME MAG., Jan. 18, 1982, at 50-58
(describing the "plots" of the games at the time to include such things as a character
scuttling about a maze eating dots (Pac-Man@), a space-ship shooting at asteroids in outer-
space (Asteroids®), and a character digging underground tunnels and using an air pump to
inflate and blow-up enemies (Dig-Dug®)).
205 See generally Philip Elmer-Dewitt, The Amazing Video Caine Boom, TIME MAG., Sept. 27,
1993, at 68-72 (noting that video-makers now develop games in which the characters do
such things as embark on adventures across the world or a country on a mission which
develops and twists and turns as the game progresses (The Inspector&)); Chris Taylor, Will I
Still Be Addicted to Video Games?, TIME MAG., June 19, 2000, at 76-77 (noting that more and
more, games are going to involve complex and intricate stories, with the designers giving
the players rich, open-ended environments).
206 See, e.g., Goroff, supra note 171, at 764-65 (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405,
409 (1974)).
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particularized message with the intricate story and plot lines that they
have created. 20 7
Therefore, adhering to the 1980s' idea that games are purely for
entertainment is a futile and pointless exercise of stare decisis.208 Instead
of following this archaic view when considering the enactment of an
ordinance aimed at regulating or restricting video games, legislators
should tailor their ordinances so that they clearly recognize video games
as protected speech under the First Amendment. Therefore, if the
Supreme Court were to hear a case involving the regulation of video
games (violent or non-violent), it would likely find that video games are
a form of entertainment that is no longer "pure entertainment" and, thus,
should be afforded First Amendment protection.
B. What is the Proper Standard to Employ Mhen Protection of Children is the
Primary Governmental Justification?
When a reviewing court is faced with a regulation based on the
content of the speech, the court presumably applies strict scrutiny.2° 9
Nevertheless, some commentators and advocates have argued that the
circuits are in disagreement regarding what level of scrutiny to apply
when faced with content-based restrictions on minors' speech that do not
materially affect adult access to the protected speech.21° The issue of
whether strict scrutiny applies where the government limits children's
access to indecent or harmful speech, but leaves adult access unfettered,
has not been explicitly addressed by the Supreme Court since Ginsberg.211
This has been one of the primary factors, but not necessarily the sole or
27 Id. Goroff argued this position in the early 1980s, at which time it was a bit of a
stretch. Id. Nevertheless, the logic of Goroff in the following example can be applied and
adapted to modem games:
When playing [the video game] Asteroids, the player does not actually
maneuver a space ship around flying bodies, but he does get a sense of
how the designer imagines space travel. A movie could give one a
similar sense of fantasy, but the video game adds another dimension
critical to the viewer's understanding-control.
Id.
208 See supra Part II.C.2 (discussing the history of the regulation of video games).
209 See supra notes 55-56, 136 and accompanying text.
210 The framework for this alleged disagreement was set forth by the city of Indianapolis
in its petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court in the American Amusement
Machine Ass'n v. Kendrick case. Certiorari Petition, supra note 89, at 15-16. Nevertheless, the
discussion did not go in-depth into the differing level of review, which this part does.
211 See supra notes 88-107 and accompanying text (discussing the opinion in Ginsberg).
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decisive factor, in the disagreement among the circuits because Ginsberg
was decided at a time before the Court had refined its scrutiny standards
for the First Amendment. 212  There are allegedly three different
standards of scrutiny that the various circuits employ. 213 Nevertheless,
this discussion will illustrate that the alleged "difference" is a mere
myth.
The Second, 214 Seventh,215 Eighth,216 and Ninth 217 Circuits employ
strict scrutiny. In other words, these circuits follow the presumptively
understood view of the Court (i.e., because these are content-based
regulations, they are presumptively invalid and thereby subject to the
strictest level of scrutiny). Since these circuits apply the understood
standard, there is no need to examine the logic and reasoning they
employ, other than to note that all of the circuits in this category applied
the Supreme Court's standard subjecting a content-based regulation to
strict scrutiny. 218
212 See supra notes 88-107 and accompanying text (discussing the opinion in Ginsberg).
213 These three groups are as follows: (1) the circuits employing the traditional standard
of strict scrutiny; (2) circuits applying a quasi-time, place, and manner standard with
content-based regulations; and (3) a single circuit applying a traditional time, place, and
manner approach.
214 Eclipse Enters., Inc. v. Gulotta, 134 F.3d 63, 66-67 (2d Cir. 1997) (applying strict
scrutiny to strike down a local law prohibiting the sale to minors of trading cards depicting
graphic violence).
215 Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n. v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 575-76 (7th Cir. 2001)
(applying strict scrutiny to strike down the Indianapolis Ordinance regulating violent
video games).
216 Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Webster, 968 F.2d 684, 689 (8th Cir. 1992) (applying
strict scrutiny to strike down state statute prohibiting rental or sale to minors of video
cassettes depicting violence).
217 Crawford v. Lungren, 96 F.3d 380, 387-88 (9th Cir. 1996) (applying strict scrutiny to
strike down a local law prohibiting the sale in unattended vending machines of magazines
that contain "harmful matter").
218 See generally Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n, 244 F.3d at 575 (noting that content-based
regulations are presumptively invalid and require strict scrutiny); Eclipse Enters., Inc., 134
F.3d at 66 ("If speech subject to regulation is of the protected category, then the regulating
statute must pass strict scrutiny if the regulation is content-based .... "); Crawford, 96 F.3d
at 384 (stating that as a general rule, "laws that by their terms distinguish favored speech
from disfavored speech on basis of ideas or views expressed are 'content-based'" and
subject to strict scrutiny); Video Software Dealers Ass'n, 968 F.2d at 688 (noting that a content-
based regulation is subject to strict scrutiny and must be narrowly drawn to promote a
compelling state interest).
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The second view is expressed by the Tenth219 and Eleventh 220
Circuits. These circuits assert that, although the regulations are content-
based and presumptively invalid, they are nevertheless a quasi-time,
place, and manner restriction, which moves the analysis down to an
intermediate level of scrutiny and reduces the government's burden in
proving its justification for enacting the regulation. 221 These circuits rely
heavily on the reasoning in Ginsberg and argue that it is not inconsistent
to apply a scrutiny slightly more deferential than strict scrutiny.222 In
particular, these circuits draw on the language in Ginsberg that the
government, when regulating or restricting only minors' access to
speech, can create "special standards" broader than what is typically
allowed when both minors' and adults' speech is suppressed.223
The third view involves only the Fourth Circuit.224 The Fourth
Circuit crafted a straightforward time, place, and manner approach
when it upheld a municipal curfew law.225 However, the Fourth Circuit
cannot be regarded as splitting from the understood strict scrutiny
standard because curfew laws are content-neutral regulations not aimed
directly at the minor's speech.226  Therefore, the arguments of
219 M.S. News Co. v. Casado, 721 F.2d 1281, 1291 (10th Cir. 1983) (upholding a city
ordinance requiring "blinder racks" be placed over the shelves on which sexually-oriented
periodicals and publications appealing to a minor's interest are located).
220 Am. Booksellers v. Webb, 919 F.2d 1493, 1512-13 (11th Cir. 1990) (upholding a statute
making it a criminal offense to display in a place accessible to minors, any material deemed
"harmful to minors" under the statute).
221 Id. at 1502 (concluding that the constitutional standards applicable to a time, place,
and manner restriction govern a statute prohibiting the display of sexually explicit material
deemed harmful to minors).
M2 M.S. News Co., 721 F.2d at 1285-86 (noting that it is not inconsistent with the Ginsberg
holding, which proscribed the sale of "girlie" magazines to minors, for a city ordinance to
prohibit promotion of sexually-oriented material to minors).
M See generally id. at 1291 (quoting Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639-40 (1968))
(noting that the logic of Ginsberg demands a lower level of scrutiny than the strictest form).
224 Schleifer v. Charlottesville, 159 F.3d 843, 847 (4th Cir. 1998). In Schleifer, the Fourth
Circuit concluded that intermediate scrutiny was the most appropriate level of review for a
constitutional challenge to a city's juvenile curfew ordinance, which the court upheld as a
regulation substantially related to its stated purposes of reducing juvenile violence and
crime and strengthening parental responsibility for children. Id.
2n Id.
226 Id. at 847-48 (noting that the aims of the curfew ordinance at issue were not directly
related to the minor's speech).
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commentators and advocates asserting that the Fourth Circuit is straying
away from the traditional Supreme Court standard is misplaced. 227
One factor that likely contributes to the alleged disagreement among
the circuits is that a court, relying primarily on a case such as Ginsberg, is
allowed more discretion in deciding what level of scrutiny to employ
when dealing with a regulation aimed at protecting children while
leaving adult access unfettered. This is because Ginsberg, although based
on the government's compelling interest in protecting children, was
decided at a time when the Court's free speech jurisprudence was not as
refined and established.228 Since then, the Court has developed more
concrete and formalistic standards. 229 This is not to say that Ginsberg has
been rendered a dead letter by the refined scrutiny standards. Ginsberg
is still recognized precedent when it comes to regulating minors' access
to speech. However, for the case to be used more efficiently and
effectively as precedent, its logic must conform to the modern structures
of scrutiny that the Court employs.
It appears that an ordinance aimed at regulating, but not absolutely
suppressing minors' access to violent video games, could fall into the
quasi-intermediate level of scrutiny employed by the second group of
circuits discussed above. 230 This is in light of the fact that much like the
Tenth and Eleventh Circuits' analysis, a violent video game ordinance's
primary justification comes from the Ginsberg holding, and, therefore,
could rely heavily on the Court's language and logic in Ginsberg.231
However, since a violent video game ordinance is a content-based
regulation aimed directly at the primary effect of the speech, it is a
logical precautionary measure to tailor the ordinance so that it meets
strict scrutiny regardless of the circuits' allegedly diverging views on the
level of scrutiny to employ.
227 See Certiorari Petition, supra note 89, at 16; see also United States v. Mento, 231 F.3d
912, 918 (4th Cir. 2000). In fact, the Fourth Circuit accepts the view that a content-based
regulation is still subject to strict scrutiny, even if it is aimed at protecting children. Id. at
918 (holding that a regulation aimed at protecting children from pornography is content
based if it is aimed at inhibiting the expression itself).
M' See supra notes 88-107 and accompanying text (discussing in detail the Ginsberg case).
229 See supra notes 131-55 and accompanying text (illustrating the Court's development of
the strict scrutiny standard as it pertains to protection of children).
230 See supra notes 219-23 and accompanying text.
231 See supra notes 219-23 and accompanying text.
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Furthermore, this difference appears to be based more on the broad
category of the protection of children and not on the content of speech at
issue in the regulations. As established by the Court's precedent, the
question of whether speech is protected by the First Amendment
depends on the content and type of speech, not on what the
government's compelling interest is in seeking to regulate that speech.232
Therefore, a jurisdiction considering a violent video game ordinance
should tailor the ordinance so that it can withstand the stringent
demands of strict scrutiny.233
C. How to Develop a Working Definition of Violence: Should Violent and
Sexually Explicit Material Be Categorized and Assessed Under a Standard
Similar to the Supreme Court's Obscenity Doctrine?
As stated above, regulating material because of its "violent content"
is a difficult task.23" Above all, a definition of violence in an ordinance
regulating video games must be explicitly clear and limited, so as to
avoid the problems of vagueness and overbreadth. 235 Therefore, the
definition must be of sufficient clarity to give a person of ordinary
intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what speech is prohibited
so that he or she may act accordingly. 236 Further, the definition must
provide explicit standards for those charged with enforcing the
ordinance.2 37 Aside from this, the definition must not "abut upon
sensitive areas" of basic First Amendment freedoms. 238 Lastly, to avoid
232 Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976) (discussing the hierarchy of
speech formulated by the Court); see also supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text
(discussing the Court's "speech hierarchy").
233 See infra Part IV (assessing and drafting a model ordinance to satisfy strict scrutiny).
2M See supra notes 174-76 and accompanying text.
235 See supra text accompanying notes 64-68 (discussing the vagueness and overbreadth
standards).
2M Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-109 (1972); see also Davis-Kidd
Booksellers, Inc. v. McWherter, 866 S.W.2d 520, 532 (Tenn. 1993) (noting that, in striking
down an ordinance aimed at regulating violence, the determination of whether or not
something constitutes "violent material" cannot be totally subjective but must give
objective guidance to the affected parties and those officials charged with its enforcement).
237 Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108-09.
2M Id.
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being unduly vague and overbroad, the definition must give a
categorical distinction of what forms of violence it intends to cover.239
Aside from these formalities in draftsmanship, the greatest hurdle a
regulation aimed at protecting minors from violent material faces is the
establishment of a causal connection between its means (i.e., regulating
violent material) and its end (i.e., protecting children from the
material).24O The best source to draw upon in establishing a causal
connection is the scientific research that has been conducted on the
effects of violent material on minors.241 While the courts typically do not
regard these studies as dispositive on the issue, the Court in Ginsberg
noted that scientific research is, at the very least, persuasive in justifying
the government's decision to regulate. 242 Furthermore, although the
consensus of the courts may be that these studies do not establish a
sufficient causal link between the means and the ends, a causal link has
not been totally disproved either. 243 Rather, it appears that, in light of
Ginsberg, a direct correlation is not essential but rather is an indication of
some, albeit minimal, affirmative link to violent material, and its effect
on minors' general state of well-being is sufficient. 244
Clearly, the method employed in the prior violent video game
ordinances will not work.245 The reason ordinances such as the one in
Indianapolis failed is because an attempt to convert the Miller obscenity
standard into a standard that also applies to violence simply complicates
the matter more than needed. The Seventh Circuit viewed Indianapolis'
239 Video Software Dealers Ass'n, Inc. v. Webster, 968 F.2d 684, 689 (8th Cir. 1992) (noting
that, had the ordinance at issue given a categorical distinction as to when violence would
not be regulated under the ordinance, it would have likely passed constitutional muster).
240 See generally Marion D. Hefner, Note, 'Roast Pigs' and Miller-Light: Variable Obscenity
in the Nineties, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 843, 877-78 (1996) (discussing the need for this
affirmative link).
241 See, e.g., Anderson & Dill, supra note 2, at 774-78 (discussing the aggressive thoughts
and patterns of behavior exhibited by children who play violent video games).
242 Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 641-43 (1968); see also supra notes 106-07 and
accompanying text (discussing the effectiveness of government reliance on scientific
studies).
243 See, e.g., Hefner, supra note 240, at 878 (drawing this inferred logic from Ginsberg).
244 Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 641.
245 See Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 574 (7th Cir. 2001).
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attempt to expand the Miller standard to include violence as stretching
Miller beyond its intended and limited purpose.246
A jurisdiction is doing itself a disservice by using the Miller
obscenity standard in regulations regarding the protection of children
from violent material for two main reasons. First, Miller is a broad and
general standard, intended to apply to the community at large rather
than a particular segment, such as minor children.247 Second, it is an
easy target for a reviewing court to strike down. A court can simply
dismiss the argument as misapplying and stretching Miller beyond its
intended purpose of regulating obscenity when presented with a violent
video game ordinance attempting to regulate violence.248
Instead of utilizing Miller and trying to pigeonhole violence into the
obscenity doctrine, a more practical and effective approach is to find a
middle-ground definition of violence.249 In order to achieve this result,
the definition must be explicit and well defined as to what type of
violence it is aimed at regulating. However, it must also not be too
explicit and over reaching, otherwise overbreadth problems will arise. 250
It is for these reasons that a definition of violence that will pass
constitutional muster is one that is explicit in its terms of what
constitutes harmful violent material to minors and one that provides the
246 Id. "[T]o squeeze ... violence into [the] familiar legal pigeonhole ... of obscenity ...
is [not proper]. Violence and obscenity are distinct categories of objectionable depiction."
Id. But see KEVIN W. SAUNDERS, VIOLENCE AS OBSCENITY 114-17 (1996) (arguing that, at least
as to children, sex can stake no superior claim over hard-core graphic violence for inclusion
within the definition of obscenity). Saunders' point is valid; however, the legal standard
developed for obscenity is intended solely to extend to the obscene and not "other" forms
of speech closely akin such as violent material. Sissela Bok, Censorship and Media Violence,
95 MICH. L. REV. 2160, 2165 (1997) (criticizing Saunders' approach as leading the United
States down the slippery slope of "full-scale censorship").
247 See supra note 36 (discussing the Miller obscenity standard); see also Henkin, supra note
103, at 413 n.68 (arguing that honing in on the particular group an ordinance is aimed at
regulating is a key factor in making it pass constitutional muster).
248 See supra note 36.
249 Hefner, supra note 240, at 879 (proposing that a legislature should draft statutory
language regulating minors' access to violent material by focusing on the material's
capacity to harm children and not on the technical requirements of the Miller obscenity
standard).
250 See, e.g., Am. Booksellers Ass'n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 329-30 (7th Cir. 1985)
(striking down a municipal ordinance because its definition of "pornography
subordinating women," which included "violent" pornography, was so broad that its reach
could literally extend to any form of speech casting women in a subservient role).
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parties affected by the regulation objective guidance so as to warn
ordinary people of the affected materials under the regulation.
IV. PROPOSAL OF A MODEL ORDINANCE FOR RESTRICTING MINORS' ACCESS
TO VIOLENT VIDEO GAMES THAT CAN PASS CONSTITUTIONAL MUSTER
A. Ahat a Violent Video Game Ordinance Must Contain: Reasons Why The
Prior Ordinances Have Failed
An ordinance attempting to restrict minors' access to violent video
games in arcades and other establishments is a content-based regulation
subject to strict scrutiny.251 Thus, a jurisdiction considering adopting
such an ordinance must establish that it has a compelling governmental
interest; that there is a fit between the means and the end; that it is
narrowly tailored; and that a plausible, less restrictive alternative is
unavailable or that the regulation promotes a substantial governmental
interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation. 252
All of these necessary elements can plausibly be met with the regulation
of violent video games in arcades and other establishments.
First, the compelling state interest is the protection of children,
which has clearly been recognized by the Court's jurisprudence. 25 3
Second, if an ordinance provides an explicit and precise definition of
what constitutes a violent video game, the ordinance will be narrowly
tailored to its purpose3254 Lastly, the fact that the games in arcades and
other places of business can only be regulated if they are separated and
kept away from minors' plain view illustrates that the goals of the
regulation would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation. 25
With the formalities of strict scrutiny aside, both the precision of
drafting as well as the clarity of the purpose for regulating violent video
games are essential for an effective ordinance. 256 Thus, in order to have
precision and clarity, the language and structure must be wholly
251 See supra Part 111.B (discussing why strict scrutiny is the proper standard of review).
252 City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 46-47 (1986).
253 See supra Part 11.B (providing a synopsis of the Court's protection of children
jurisprudence).
25 See, e.g., Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 212 (1975).
2- See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 782-83 (1989).
2% See supra Part III.C (discussing the need for such draftsmanship in an ordinance
attempting to regulate violent material).
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separate from the Miller obscenity standard.257 Prior ordinances have not
done so, and this oversight has been the fatal flaw in these ordinances. 258
B. Proposed Definition Section of a Violent Video Game Ordinance
The substantive provisions and requirements of the prior violent
video game ordinances are not fatally flawed. The methods and means
by which they have sought to regulate minors' access to video games are
not the problem the courts have had in upholding such ordinances. 259
Rather, the only portions that need to be restructured, according to the
Seventh Circuit, are the definitions of what constitutes a "violent video
game" and what constitutes a "violent video game harmful to
minors." 260 Such a scheme would be as follows:
Definitions
(a) For the purpose of this ordinance, a "Violent Video Game
Machine" is defined as:
(1) A currency-operated gaming machine whose visual
depiction or realistic representation of death or severe injury
to a human or human-like being, including, but not limited to:
decapitation, dismemberment, repeated instances of bloodshed,
grotesque cruelty, mutilation, maiming, or disfiguration in a
way such that the depiction or representation constitutes
"strong animated or life-like violence" under the Coin-
Operated Video Game Parental Advisory System and is also
capable of shocking the conscience of persons under seventeen
years of age and exceeding the boundaries of what should be
tolerated in a civilized society; or
(2) A violent point and shoot currency-operated video
simulator that involves one or more individuals firing
257 See supra text accompany notes 247-49 (discussing why violence cannot be regulated
in a similar fashion as obscenity).
258 See supra Part II.C.3-4 (discussing the various problems encountered by Indianapolis).
259 See Indianapolis, Ind., Ordinance No. 72, 2000 (July 17, 2000), §§ 2-6; see supra note 10
(providing the text of the Indianapolis Ordinance); see also supra notes 178-82 and
accompanying text (discussing the substantive provisions of the Indianapolis Ordinance).
260 See Indianapolis, Ind., Ordinance No. 72, 2000 (July 17, 2000), §§ 2-6; see supra note 10
(providing the text of the Indianapolis Ordinance); see also supra notes 178-82 and
accompanying text (discussing the substantive provisions of the Indianapolis Ordinance).
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simulated weapons at a video screen that depicts human
silhouettes, life-like representation of human beings, or
civilian transportation services, including, but not limited to,
representations of cars, buses, trains, aircraft, and commercial
and residential structures and contains realistic depictions of
physical injury to a human silhouette or life-like
representation of a human being and realistic depictions of
physical injury to a human being and realistic depictions of
blood, gore, mutilation, or dismemberment of such silhouettes
or human beings.261
Commentary
These two classifications of violent video games provide narrowly-
tailored definitions. Neither has the potential for an unfathomable reach
because they are specific to the games they intend to regulate, nor will
those affected by the ordinance be unable to discern what is and is not a
"violent video game" in their establishments. As such, neither definition
is vague. First, neither of the definitions encounter overbreadth
problems. This is because the definitions are not excessive in regulation
nor are they substantially excessive in relation to the ordinance's plainly
legitimate sweep of protecting children. The definitions are not
excessive in regulation because they have honed in on a particular
segment of violent video games (i.e., those that are currency operated
and located in places of business as well as those games that are
considered to be "red sticker" games with strong animated or life-like
violence under the Coin-Operated Video Game Parental Advisory
System). Along these same lines, the definitions are not substantially
excessive because they focus on the particular types of games the
ordinance is aimed at regulating to protect children. On the other end of
the spectrum, the definitions are not so vague as to "confuse" the
affected person as to what qualifies as a violent video game. Instead, the
definitions set out with a certain level of precision and clarity the games
that are affected by the ordinance. By doing so, the regulation provides
affected individuals with certain "guide-posts" for what is considered a
violent video game under the ordinance with its inclusion of the Coin-
261 This definition of a "violent video game" is based on the proposed legislation in New
Jersey and New York as well as the Coin-Operated Video Game Parental Advisory System.
See generally supra note 183 (discussing the state legislation); supra note 173 (discussing the
advisory system).
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Operated Video Game Parental Advisory System. This is a well-
structured and formulaic approach that easily allows an affected person,
as well as those charged with enforcing the ordinance, to determine
whether particular games fall under the scope of these definitions.
(b) For the purpose of this ordinance, a "Violent Video Game
Harmful to Minors" is any violent video game describing or
representing, in whatever form, blood, gore, mutilation, or
dismemberment, when it:
(1) predominantly appeals to morbid interest of minors
seventeen years of age and younger when it comes to violent
video games; and
(2) is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult
community as a whole with respect to what is suitable for
minors seventeen years of age and younger; and
(3) is utterly without redeeming social importance for minors
seventeen years of age and younger.262
Commentary
This "harmful to minors" definition is patterned after the state
statute the Court upheld in Ginsberg. It may appear to the untrained eye
or those taking a "casual glance" at this definition, that it is comparable
to the Miller obscenity standard. However, that is not the case. Indeed,
Miller and Ginsberg have a substantial amount of overlap; nevertheless,
the standards also have several differences. Chief among these
differences is that the approach utilized here applies only to minors
seventeen years of age and younger. In contrast, if Miller were to be
employed, the regulation would either apply to the entire community at
large, or in the case of the Indianapolis Ordinance, apply to individuals
eighteen years of age and younger. While there does not appear to be a
major difference in one year of age, the Court has suggested in cases
such as Reno, that a regulation targeting minors seventeen and younger
makes more sense than those regulations that regard individuals as
262 The "violent video games harmful to minors" definition is based on three sources. See
generally Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 646-47 (1968); Henkin, supra note 103, at 413
n.68; Hefner, supra note 240, at 877-78.
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"minors" up until they turn eighteen. 263 Aside from this main difference,
the proposed definition also avoids the fatal flaw that the prior
jurisdictions have faced when they attempt to "squeeze" violence into
the categorical structure devoted solely to obscenity that the Court
established with the Miller standard. Unlike Miller, Ginsberg has never
been pigeonholed into one form of speech. Instead, Ginsberg's reach has
been interpreted as extending to varying types of speech that are
harmful to minors. However, this extension is, as the Court illustrated in
Reno, predicated on the fact that the regulation in question is tailored in
the same or similar way as the regulation upheld by the Court in
Ginsberg. The "harmful to minors" definition of this proposed ordinance
clearly attempts to provide a tailored regulation, and that helps to correct
the fatal flaw that prior jurisdictions possessed in their ordinances.
C. General Synopsis of the Proposed Ordinance
These portions of a proposed ordinance clarify the problems that
Indianapolis faced and that the other jurisdictions contemplating such
ordinances will face, if they are to rely on a vague definition of violence
or the Miller obscenity standard. The definitions of violence are clearly
not exhaustive. These definitions focus on particular types and contents
of video games, thereby making them narrowly tailored to particular
categorical distinctions of violence, a distinction that the prior ordinances
were lacking. Also, by using the Ginsberg standard for the definition of
"harmful to minors," rather than attempting to modify the Miller
approach, a legislator has less of a hurdle to meet since the definition
focuses on the particular group it is attempting to regulate, rather than
the community at large.
As has already been established, the Ginsberg and Miller standards
appear on the surface to be comparable standards in substance and
structure, with both being aimed at regulating "low-value" speech.264
However, if one goes beneath the surface and dissects the two standards,
it becomes apparent that they are not entirely similar for two main
reasons. First, Miller applies to the community at large, whereas Ginsberg
263 Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844,864-67 (1997).
264 See supra Part IV.B (discussing how the Ginsberg standard employed in the model
ordinance of this Note appears on its face, or at a casual glance, identical to the Miller
standard).
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is designed to restrict minors' access to the harmful speech.265 Second
and lastly, the Court has repeatedly held that Miller is intended to apply
solely to speech that is obscene and is not intended to apply to speech
that is similar to obscene speech in terms of "social value," such as
speech involving violence.266
With these differences established, it becomes apparent that Ginsberg
is the correct standard to employ when the government is attempting to
regulate a form of speech that is neither obscene nor harmful to adults
but instead only harmful to minors. Regardless of these differences and
the greater amount of discretion and deference afforded to the
government when it attempts to protect children by regulating harmful
speech, the Court in Reno illustrated its reluctance to expand Ginsberg
into other areas of speech unless certain criteria are met.267 However,
unlike the CDA at issue in Reno, a court would be unable to draw the
four key distinctions that the Court did between the CDA and the statute
at issue in Ginsberg.268 Therefore, the ordinance proposed in this Note
appears able to overcome the reluctance the Court had in expanding the
Ginsberg standard in Reno.
V. CONCLUSION
Without a doubt, the protection of children is a compelling interest
that the government holds closely and regards as fundamental to
maintain a decent and moralistic society for its minors free from the
detrimental influence of violent speech, such as violent video games. As
this Note illustrates, a narrowly tailored ordinance with clear and
explicit definitions of what constitutes a violent video game harmful to
265 See supra notes 36, 88-107 and accompanying text (discussing the Miller and Ginsberg
standards separately).
266 See, e.g., Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 574 (7th Cir. 2001)
(noting that Miller has created a "familiar legal pigeonhole" in which only obscene speech
can be regulated; other forms of speech such as violent speech cannot be "squeezed" into
the Miller standard according to Judge Posner).
267 Reno, 521 U.S. at 864-67; see supra note 145 (discussing the Court's reasons regarding
why Ginsberg and Reno could not be compared).
268 Reno, 521 U.S. at 864-67. With the ordinance proposed in this Note, the problems
Congress faced in Reno with the CDA are not presented here. First, the ultimate
determination of whether a minor under seventeen will play a violent video game rests
with the minor's parent or guardian. Second, this ordinance applies only to commercial
transactions. Third, this ordinance's definition is narrow and particular. Lastly, a "minor"
for the purposes of this ordinance is any person under seventeen years of age, not eighteen.
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minors, based on the Ginsberg precedent rather than the Miller obscenity
standard, is the key for an ordinance regulating minors' access to violent
video games to pass constitutional muster. Furthermore, although the
Court denied certiorari in the case involving the Indianapolis Ordinance,
this denial perhaps implicitly demonstrated the Court's reluctance to
delve into the area at this current time and instead leave it to develop in
the "social experiments" by legislators and the scholarly community. 269
Nonetheless, since the Indianapolis test case, other jurisdictions have
proposed similar ordinances, which illustrates that the experiment
continues. This Note attempts to lend a hand to the situation by tailoring
its proposed portions of the ordinance in a manner similar to the statute
at issue in Ginsberg, rather than trying to convert the Miller obscenity
standard into a violence and obscenity standard, which simply cannot
stand.
Scott A. Pyle*
269 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(noting that it is "one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous
[urisdiction] may ... serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments
... "); see also Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 505 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (stating that
one of the great strengths of the federal system is that the state and local governments serve
as "experimental social laboratories," which have the capacity to introduce "novel
techniques of social control").
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